Three Essays on Immigration and Institutions by Ghosh, Atisha
Three Essays on Immigration and Institutions
Submitted by Atisha Ghosh
to the University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
In February 2018
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper
acknowledgement.
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for
the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Signature:
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
Chapter 1 shows how an elite can turn an institution from being inclusive to ex-
tractive, in the context of the European Union’s free movement of persons (FMP).
In an international labor market, integrated by FMP across a number of member
countries, we consider expansion of the market through the addition of new mem-
bers. Each member government can control only immigration from non-members.
The main result is that if new members are decreasing in total factor productivity,
then expansion at first benefits but later hurts workers, while first hurting but later
benefiting an economic elite, and benefiting a political elite throughout.
Chapter 2 shows how a government sets immigration policy in the presence of
entrepreneurs who undertake investment. The government and the entrepreneurs
negotiate to determine the quota of immigration and the amount of contribution
to be paid to the government. We also show how a government may be willing to
tie its hands to an institution that constrains the immigration policy it can set. We
identify conditions such that by tying its hands to such an institution, the govern-
ment can increase investment in the economy.
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of public good provision on the location choice
of immigrants in the UK. In particular, we investigate the impact of a change
in the number of schools on the location choice of immigrants by exploiting an
exogenous shock provided by the Academies Act of 2010. We first employ a
difference-in-difference strategy to analyse the effect of the Academies Act on
immigration levels by comparing North West England and Wales, since the act
was only applicable to England. In a separate analysis, we estimate a discrete
choice model to examine the location choice of immigrants using a panel data of
London boroughs. This model reports that a 1% increase in number of schools in
a London borough increases the number of immigrants by 1.4%, on average.
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Chapter 1
Turning an Institution from
‘Inclusive’ to ‘Extractive’ : The Case
of the European Union’s ‘Free
Movement of Persons’
1.1 Introduction
The economic development of a nation depends on its governing institutions. In
his seminal paper, North (1991) defines institutions as ‘humanly devised con-
straints that structure political, economic and social interactions’. These con-
straints could be formal rules, such as laws and structures that defend property
rights, or they could be informal restrictions like traditions and customs. And
they may be economic or political, constraining the actions of economic agents
and politicians respectively. The idea that the prosperity of society depends on
economic institutions such as property rights goes back at least as far as Adam
Smith, and is prominent in the work of nineteenth century scholars such as John
Stuart Mill (Jones 1981). At the same time, political institutions are also critical
in supporting prosperity. It is well recognized that institutions such as elections
and constitutional checks, that constrain the policies that politicians can set, play a
11
crucial role in minimizing the rents they can attain from office (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson 2005). Following North’s definition, institutions have been further
categorized into one of two types. The first type are referred to by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012) as ‘inclusive’, because they uphold the interests of society
at large and are regarded as instrumental in creating an economic environment
that enhances labor productivity.1 The second type are referred to by Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) as ‘extractive’, because they concentrate power in
the hands of the elite and create an environment where labor productivity may be
undermined.2 An extensive literature traces development successes and failures
to a prevalence of one or other type of institution: inclusive or extractive respec-
tively (Knack and Keefer 1995, Hall and Jones 1999, Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson 2001).
Going beyond the typology of institutions being inclusive or extractive, Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012) discuss informally the idea that an elite may subvert
an institution from initially being inclusive to eventually being extractive. As a re-
sult, although at the outset an institution might serve the interests of society, it
ultimately serves only those of the elite. The purpose of this chapter is to provide
a first formalization of this idea, focusing specifically on the European Union’s
(EU’s) ‘Free Movement of Persons’ (FMP).3 The FMP is open to interpretation
as an economic institution, because it has created a single labor market within
Europe. But it may also be interpreted as a political institution because it enables
European citizens to ‘vote with their feet’ in moving freely from one European
country to another. In the UK, migrants from the EU have voting rights in local
elections and elections to the European Parliament. In effect, the FMP imposes
a constraint on how politicians can set policy, in this case on immigration. Our
analysis shows how a political elite may have driven expansion of the EU, at first
because this coincided with an increase in the prosperity of society as a whole,
1Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) use the alternative terminology ‘institutions of pri-
vate property’ to refer to the same basic idea.
2In this chapter we assume elites could be of two types : the economic elite formed by en-
trepreneurs or owners of firms and the political elite which is the government.
3A fundamental principle of the EU is the free movement of persons. According to this clause,
citizens of the EU can reside and work in any of the 28 EU member states, as well as the three
non-EU countries in the European Economic Area and Switzerland.
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but later because it served only their own interests and those of a narrow eco-
nomic elite.
In the prior literature, political institutions are inclusive or extractive by def-
inition. Therefore, the only way to go from inclusive to extractive is through a
change in the form of government i.e. moving between dictatorship and democ-
racy through a revolution or coup d’état. Our approach is different in that we
interpret an institution as ‘inclusive’ or ‘extractive’ in terms of its effect on welfare
outcomes to the respective groups in society. Inclusive institutions increase the
welfare of society as a whole, while allowing for the possibility that at least one
group may be adversely affected. Extractive institutions, on the other hand, en-
able an elite group, who are in a minority, to increase their welfare while that of
the rest of society decreases. Within this framework, we can then show how a
political elite can turn an institution from being inclusive to extractive without a
wholesale change in the form of government.
In our model, the FMP has clear cut distributional implications for labor and
capital. Therefore, we can be precise about the conditions under which an expan-
sion of the EU under FMP will benefit or harm the respective groups in society.
Using this framework, we will be able to show how a political elite can turn an in-
stitution from initially being inclusive under the early stages of expansion, to being
extractive in the later stages of expansion.
The model that we develop is as follows. In a region of the world, a “ Union"
is a group of countries amongst which the movement of labor is free as a result
of FMP. There is a number of countries outside of the Union, both in the region
and in the ‘rest of the world’, from where labor can migrate to the Union. The
FMP implies that Union governments cannot restrict migration between Union
countries, but each member government can set a quota on immigration from
countries outside of the Union.
The economic structure of a single representative country in the region is as
follows. It has one sector of production producing a single homogeneous good,
using two factors of production: capital and labor. Production takes place ac-
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cording to a standard Cobb-Douglas technology, with decreasing returns to scale
and full employment of both factors. Society is divided into three groups: en-
trepreneurs, the government, and workers. Entrepreneurs represent the eco-
nomic elite, while the government represents the political elite, and workers rep-
resent the rest of society. Entrepreneurs are the sole owners of capital. Their
welfare is derived from the returns to capital and profits. Their income is increas-
ing in the amount of labor available because it is decreasing in wages. Workers
derive all their income from labor and this determines their welfare. Domestic la-
bor and immigrants are substitutes in production.4 So an increase in immigration
pushes down wages, which makes workers worse off. Under our utilitarian ap-
proach, the government’s welfare is dependent on that of the other two groups, as
well as rents that the government receive from the immigration quota. Wages are
determined as an equilibrium of the local labor market. If the country is a member
of the Union, wages are determined as an equilibrium of the Union labor market.
The wage in the rest of the world outside the region is set exogenously below that
of any wage in the region, reflecting an infinite potential supply of workers.
In this framework, we can model the process of Union expansion in terms of
an increase in the number of countries that are included in the Union, and hence
the pool of labor from which the government cannot prevent immigration. Taking
Union membership as given, the decision-making process of the government of
a particular member country is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage,
the government maximizes its welfare to decide on the immigration quota from the
non-member countries. This is done in anticipation of the fact that, in the second
stage, wages are equalized between the countries in the Union due to the FMP.
To examine the implications of Union expansion, we first assume that all coun-
tries in the region have the same total factor productivity. We then consider an
environment where all countries have differing levels of productivity. We grant one
country in the region the power to invite others to form and join the Union, one
4The assumption of homogeneous labor implies that the median voter’s wages get competed
down by increased immigration. This simplifies the situation because high skilled native labor is
complementary to immigrant labor, and hence may gain from increased migrant labor. However,
Borjas (2015) argues that it is possible to extend such models of homogeneous labor to allow for
more than one type of labor.
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by one. We refer to this country as the ‘agenda setter’. When TFP is symmetric
across all countries, it makes no difference which the agenda setter is. When
TFP varies across countries, it will make sense for the most productive country to
be the agenda setter as we shall see.
To examine Union expansion, we look at how an increase in the number of
Union countries affects the payoffs to the respective groups within a country.
When countries in the region have the same TFP, as the number of countries
in the Union increases, the government of each country in the Union (optimally)
tightens its quota for immigrants from the rest of the world. Surprisingly, as the
Union expands, the government of each country has an incentive to reduce the
total number of workers in the country by reducing the number of immigrants from
the rest of the world. This stems from the fact that, as the Union expands, a larger
number of immigrants are able to enter the country from other member countries,
without paying a quota rent. In the government’s utilitarian national welfare func-
tion, which is standard, this tips the government’s incentives away from raising
quota rents and towards increasing domestic wages. This in turn motivates a
tightening of the quota to the point where there are fewer workers in the economy
overall. Consequently, total employment decreases while wages rise, matching
patterns in the data over early EU expansion. Figure 1.1 is drawn from data ob-
tained for the OECD and it shows the movement of annual wages in the UK over
the period 2000-2016. We can see that till 2006, there was a rise in real wages.
However, after that, particularly from 2007 onwards, there has been a downward
trend in the wage schedule, though around 2008 there was a slight move up-
wards. This general downward trend in real wages seemed to occur soon after
the major EU expansion to the East European countries. Though such a trend in
wages could also be explained by alternate drivers such as the global financial
crisis of 2008, we try to tease out the possibility of such a trend occurring be-
cause of increased immigration into the UK from other more populated European
countries.
We find that the process of Union expansion increases the welfare of society
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as a whole, specifically of the workers and the government, although the welfare
of entrepreneurs declines over this range with the increase in wages. Since the
quota tightens with Union expansion, ongoing expansion will eventually push the
quota to a floor below which it cannot be reduced further. Surprisingly, we find that
when productivity is the same across all union members, adding further countries
once the floor has been reached does not lead to a fall (or rise) in wages. This is
because, with all new entrants to the Union being identical, the increased demand
for labor brought about by the introduction of new capital to the union is equal to
the increase in supply of labor.
Figure 1.1: Average Annual Wages in the UK at 2016 constant prices, pound
sterling, 2000-2016
Source: OECD
When TFP varies across countries, we identify conditions under which it is
optimal for the agenda setter to invite other countries to join the Union in de-
scending order of their productivity. Because each new member has signficantly
lower productivity and hence wages, wages in the Union decline with expansion.
Thus Union expansion under the institutional structure of the FMP, while initially
working in favour of the interests of workers, turns against them once the floor is
reached, while increasing the returns to capital for entrepreneurs, who represent
the economic elite. However, the pay off to the government, representing the po-
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litical elite, keeps on increasing even after the floor on immigration from the rest
of the world is reached.
One might have expected the FMP to help the government act in the interests
of entrepreneurs right from the outset of Union expansion. The government could
apparently use Union expansion to commit to greater immigration through FMP,
hence bringing down domestic wages. But, because FMP denies the government
the ability to collect quota rent from immigrants from the Union, as the Union
expands the government actually has an incentive at the margin to tighten the
immigration quota on immigrants from outside the Union in order to raise domestic
wages. This effect prevails until Union expansion pushes the quota to a floor.
It is only after the floor is reached, and in an environment where productivity of
successive entrants is declining, that further Union expansion serves the interests
of the economic elite by leading to a decline in wages. This explains how the FMP
could start out as an inclusive institution but eventually becomes an extractive
one.
This chapter contributes to the recent strand of literature that describes how
elites can manipulate political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) exam-
ine how the elite can concede democracy to the poor in a bid to avoid a revo-
lution. However, because democracy involves redistribution from the rich to the
poor, the elite will try to mount a coup that restores dictatorship, potentially lead-
ing to an unstable cycle between forms of government. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2008) show how the elite manipulate political institutions to keep the division
of economic rents constant even through democratization. This explains how in
practice, contrary to expectations, democratization may do nothing to improve the
welfare of the rest of society. By contrast, we are examining a change in an eco-
nomic institution while keeping a political institution constant, namely democracy,
and showing how the elite nevertheless manipulate the outcome in their favour.
Besley and Persson (2009) focus on the decision by a ruling elite not to install
fiscal capacity as a deliberate step to prevent the possibility of their own assets
being taxed, thus undermining the incentive of the rest of society to seize their
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political power. The prior literature has looked at inclusive and extractive institu-
tions separately. Our contribution is to examine how a political elite can turn a
given institution from being inclusive to extractive.
This chapter also contributes to the literature that deals with the demand for
immigrants (Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005). In this respect this chapter also an-
alyzes the formulation of immigration policy by the government of a destination
country. However, we incorporate the role of an institution in the form of FMP
in constraining immigration policy. The present chapter also builds on work by
Borjas (2015) which studies the effect of movement of homogeneous workers
between two regions on the host and destination countries. We also build on
Facchini and Willmann (2005), who address the issue of a government formulat-
ing policies on labor movement into a country where the government captures
rent from the quota on the incoming labor. Our current work follows the same
approach in which a utilitarian social welfare maximizing government captures a
certain portion of the immigrants’ income as quota rents.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model and its
implications. Section 1.3 discusses the various stages involved in the determi-
nation of the immigration quota in a country belonging to the Union. Section 1.4
describes endogenous union formation in cases of technologically symmetric and
asymmetric countries respectively while section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 The Model
We model a region of the world in which there are M countries. We will refer to
countries outside the region as the rest of the world (ROW). A subset, N 2 M, of
the countries in the region form a Union.5 We will assume that only one Union can
form in the region. The key institutional feature of the Union is FMP, under which
workers can move freely from one Union member country to another. The popula-
tion of each country in the region is divided between entrepreneurs and workers.
5With some abuse of notation, we will use N to denote both the set, and the number, of coun-
tries in the Union.
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Each entrepreneur owns a single firm that produces a homogeneous final good,
and also owns the capital that is invested in their firm. The firms are competitive
and they are price takers in the goods market. The mass of native borne workers
in the economy is normalized to 1.6 The population of entrepreneurs is normal-
ized to s, and we assume that entrepreneurs form a minority of the population :
(s < 1). Thus, the total mass of the native born population in the economy is 1+s.
Net immigration to country i 2 N from the other countries in the Union is given by
l˜i, which may be positive or negative. Wage in each prospective member country
(belonging to the region M) is higher than the wage in the ROW. The government
can control entry of immigrants from the ROW by an immigration quota, denoted
lIi. Therefore, the total population of workers in country i is given by Li = 1 + l˜i + l
I
i.
Note that entrepreneurs cannot migrate in our model. This assumption is made
to focus attention on the affect of FMP on labor migration. Each country in M is
endowed with a fixed quanitity of capital, Ki, also to sharpen the focus on labor
migration.
The production function for the good of a representative country i is denoted
by Qi = iKi
p
Li, where the total factor productivity (TFP) parameter, i 2 (0, 1), is
taken as given, and  + 12 < 1. Thus, the production function exhibits decreasing
returns to scale.7Assuming decreasing returns to scale ensures a unique profit
maximizing plan for a firm. Because factor markets are competitive, labor and
capital are paid their marginal products: ri = iK 1i
p
Li and wi = 12i
Kip
Li
.
Assuming the price of the final good to be 1 and entrepreneurs to be homoge-
neous, the profits of the entrepreneurs of country i are given by
6We assume that all countries in the region have the same population prior to immigration
taking place.
7Since firms are competitive, the production function should exhibit non-increasing returns to
scale. Assuming decreasing returns approximates an alternative set-up where the technology
exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and capital, but where there is a specific factor that is
in fixed supply, such as managerial expertise, that is distributed evenly among the entrepreneurs
in the country, and the net returns after paying labor and capital accrues entirely to this specific
factor.
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i = iKi
p
Li   riKi   wiLi
= iKi
p
Li   iK 1i
p
LiKi   12i
Kip
Li
Li
= (
1
2
  )iKi
p
Li
We can see from this solution for profits how entry of more immigrant labor
will push down domestic wages, and thus, hurt domestic workers.
On the other hand, lower wages increase profits of the entrepreneurs. The
wage in ROW is given exogenously by w. We will assume that w is sufficiently
low that everyone in ROW would like to migrate to the region. Thus, by assump-
tion, w < wi for all i 2 1, ...,M. Under this assumption, the immigration quota lIi
binds in equilibrium.
1.2.1 Immigration Quota and Government Welfare
Although immigrants to country i earn the same wage as natives, wi, they have to
pay a ‘quota rent’ to the government when they enter the country. We will assume
that the quota rent is only part of the surplus from immigration. Also, the rent is
extracted only from immigrants coming into the country from outside the Union
and not from intra Union migrants. Thus, after having paid the quota rent to the
government, immigrants are left with the ‘net wage’ of  = w + . Here, w is
the wage they would have earned had they remained in the source country and
 > 0 is the immigration surplus retained by a migrant.8 This set-up implies that
the government captures the quota rent per immigrant, wi  .9 Under full surplus
capture, the government would set  such that only immigrants from the rest of
8In case of the ROW, wj = w.
9The fact that immigrants’ earnings are effectively lower than natives can be explained by
the visa costs and NHS surcharge payable by immigrants into UK from outside the EU. Health
surcharge introduced on 6th April 2015 is £200 per year for temporary non EEA migrants and
£150 per year for non EEA students. Revenue collected from NHS surcharge between 6th April
2015-14th March 2016 by the UK government is £175.6m. Also, Home Office income from visa
and immigration has been £1086m and £1182m for the years 2015-16 and 2016-17 respectively.
Similarly in France, non EEA migrants without work do not have access to benefits unlike those
guaranteed to EU nationals without a job (since these are guaranteed by the EU in order to
standardise social security systems in member countries). Also, income support for pensioners is
available to non EEA nationals only if they have worked in France for ten years.
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the world want to migrate to country i, and the government would capture all of
the immigration surplus wi   w from them.10
The government sets the quota lIi to maximize its welfare, as captured by the
following utilitarian national welfare function:
GWi = s(i + riKi) + wi(1 + l˜i) + (wi   )l Ii (1.1)
In setting lIi, the government balances the welfare of its citizens plus immi-
grants from the rest of the Union against its own utility via the quota rent. As we
will show below, the terms i, ri, and wi can be expressed as functions of lIi. And
as we shall see, when the government tightens (i.e. reduces) lIi, wi will increase
because this will reduce the overall labor supply in country i, all else equal. The
return to entrepreneurs, i + riKi, is increasing in the quota, whereas the return to
domestic workers via the wage, wi, is decreasing. With just these two terms in
(1.1), GWi is concave but monotonically increasing in lIi, leading the government
to want to exclude non-Union immigrants all together. The role of the quota rent
term, (wi   )lIi is to ensure that GWi is concave and eventually decreasing in
lIi, and is necessary for the existence of a unique interior optimal solution. The
reason for including l˜i is to obtain a closed form optimal solution for lIi. This is a
reasonable assumption given that, under FMP, in many European countries Union
immigrants are given some degree of political representation immediately.11
10In that case, for any immigrant from a country j in the region M, the immigration surplus
retained by the immigrant j < 0, which is why they would not want to migrate to country i.
11In the UK, EU migrants can vote in the local elections as well as election to the European
Parliament. Under the political system in the UK, local elections have a direct impact at the
national level since they comprise of the same political parties. Also, EU citizens with jobs in
the UK have similar access to benefits s UK citizens. If an EU migrant is covered by the social
security system, then they can claim child benefit and child tac credit for their dependent children
who may not even be living in the UK. Non EEA citizens are not subject to public funds like
jobseekers’ allowance or tax credits.
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1.3 Equilibrium in the Union under the Free Move-
ment of Persons
In this section we will determine the equilibrium outcome in the Union. At this
stage, we are taking Union membership as given. All countries in the region but
outside the Union set their immigration quotas on a unilateral basis. The above
model can be used to determine the behavior of each government outside the
Union simply by assuming that they are in a ‘singleton’ of their own.
Events in a country i within the Union proceed in two stages. In Stage 1, the
government of country i sets the immigration quota to maximize its welfare as
given by (1.1). Let lI i be the the sum total of all the immigration quotas set by
the other governments in the Union. Then the best response immigration quota
of country i is a function of the other countries’ immigration quotas i.e. lˆIi = g(l
I
 i).
A Nash Equilibrium is a set of mutual best responses lˆIi = g( ˆl
I
 i), for all i 2 N. In
Stage 2, the Union labor market clears: free movement between the countries in
the Union leads to the equalization of wages between them. In our subsequent
analysis, we assume country i chooses its quota lIi for given quotas l
I
 i of the other
countries in the Union. The optimal immigration policy of country i is determined
by working backwards from stage 2.
1.3.1 Stage 2: Labor Market Clearing under FMP
In Stage 2, wages are equalized between all the countries in the Union and this
determines net movement of people between the countries. Thus we have a
system of equations such that
1
2
j
K jq
1 + l Ij + l˜j
=
1
2
i
K iq
1 + l Ii + l˜i
, 8j 6= i , i , j 2 N.
In equilibrium,we have l˜1+ l˜2+....+ ˜lN = 0. This enables us to obtain a structural
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form for net migration into country i:
l˜i =
i
2K 2i
NP
j=1
i 6=j
(1 + l Ij ) 
NP
j=1
i 6=j
j
2K 2j (1 + l
I
i )
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
(1.2)
From the above equation we can see that the higher is the immigration quota
of country i, the lower will be the number of people who can enter the country un-
der FMP and equalise wages among the countries in the Union. Also, the higher
is the immigration quota set by the other countries, the larger is the number of
people who will come into country i through FMP. Correspondingly total employ-
ment in country i, which is the sum of native workers, people coming to the coun-
try through the FMP, and immigrants from the ROW (capture by the immigration
quota lIi) can be expressed as:
12
1 + l Ii + l˜i =
2i
NP
j=1
(1 + l Ij )
NP
j=1
j
2qji
=
2i K
2
i
NP
j=1
(1 + l Ij )
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
(1.3)
where qji = K2j =K
2
i .
The higher is the total labour force in the countries forming the Union (consist-
ing of both natives as well as immigrants), the higher is total labour employment
in country i. In other words, for given immigration quotas of other countries in the
Union, the higher is the immigration quota of country i, the greater is the labour
employment in country i. Using (1.3), we can obtain structural forms for wages,
rental rate and entrepreneurial profits and they are expressed as :
w˜i =
1
2
vuut NX
j=1
j
2K 2j

=
 NX
j=1
(1 + l Ij )

(1.4)
r˜i = i2K 2 1i
vuut NX
j=1
(1 + l Ij )

=
 NX
j=1
j
2K 2j

(1.5)
12Detailed derivations are in Appendix A.1
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˜i = (
1
2
  )i2K 2i
vuut NX
j=1
(1 + l Ij )

=
 NX
j=1
j
2K 2j

(1.6)
The structural forms of the wage, rental rate and profits provide us with some
insight on how the immigration quota of country i, can affect returns to agents
in country i, for given employment in other countries in the Union. While rental
rate and profits are directly proportional to the immigration quota, for given capital
stock and quotas of the other countries, wages in country i are inversely propor-
tional to the immigration quota. This implies that, with an increased number of
people coming into the country through the quota, there is greater labor market
competition which pushes down wages.
1.3.2 Stage 1: Setting the Quota to Maximize GovernmentWel-
fare
In Stage 1, country i’s government decides on lIi, anticipating l˜i. Subsequently, we
can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1: As the number of countries N in the Union increases, the immi-
gration quota from the rest of the world of a country i 2 N decreases, for given
immigration quotas of other countries in the Union. Total employment in country i
decreases as well, and consequently the wage wi increases.
Proof.
For details of derivation refer to Appendix A.2
To understand the intuition behind the proposition, we use expressions for total
labor employment (1.3), wages (1.4), rental rate (1.5) and profits (1.6), in (1.1),
government welfare can be simplified to
GW (l Ii ) =
 s + 1
2

i
2K 2i
vuut NX
j=1
(1 + l Ij )

=
 NX
j=1
j
2K 2j

  l Ii (1.7)
Maximization of government welfare with respect to lIi gives the optimal immi-
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gration quota for country i:
lˆ Ii =

s + 1
4
2
i
4K 4i
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
  N  
NX
j=1
i 6=j
l Ij (1.8)
Consequently, total labor employment can be determined as
1 + lˆ Ii + l˜i =

s + 1
4
2
i
6K 6i
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
2 (1.9)
The immigration quota of country i from ROW is lower as the number of coun-
tries in the Union N increases, for given immigration quotas of the other coun-
tries in the Union. The quota lˆIi is directly proportional to the proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the economy. However, the higher is , the lower will be lˆIi. This is
because a higher  implies lower quota rent from immigration to country i. Simi-
larly, total employment 1 + lˆIi + l˜i as given by (1.9) is decreasing in N. We see this
from the fact that the summation sign in the denominator depends on N.13 Thus,
the corresponding wages are higher when the country is in a Union than when it
is a singleton.
The reason behind the above result is that as one more person enters from
the Union through FMP, the wage decreases. At the original quota, this would
reduce the quota rent per immigrant that the government could get. In order to
compensate itself for this, the government has to increase wages by reducing the
quota. Consequently we find that as N increases, wages increase initially while
total employment decreases.
1.4 Endogenous Union Formation
We will now relax the assumption that Union membership is given and use the
model set out above to look at the endogenous formation of Union membership.
To do this, we will first assume in the next subsection that the countries in region
13Total labour employment for a standalone country is
 s+1
4
2
i
2K2i
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M are symmetric in the sense that their TFP parameters are identical: 1 = 2 = ...
= M. In the subsection after that, we will assume that countries are asymmetric
in that their TFP parameters vary as follows: 1 > 2 > ... > M. In both cases,
we will assume that country 1 is exogenously chosen to invite other countries to
join it in the Union. Accordingly, we will say that country 1 is the ‘agenda setter’.
We will then find the effects on the returns to the government representing the
political elite, the entrepreneurs who are the economic elite and the workers who
form the rest of society.
We have already shown that as the number of countries in the Union in-
creases, the optimal immigration quota of a particular country lˆIi decreases. We
now want to focus the discussion on the Agenda Setter, country 1, and lˆIi. This
continues until the point where the number of countries in the Union is such that
the immigration quota of country 1 reaches a lower bound, or ‘floor’, lI1, below
which the immigration quota cannot fall further. In our model, this floor will be
reached at zero. In practice, there may be other considerations such as family
ties that mean the floor will be attained at a positive level of immigration. Thus,
when lˆI1 is at the floor l
I
1, even if country 1 invites an additional country to join
the Union, it cannot decrease lˆI1 further. Suppose  is the value of N such that
county 1 reaches its lI1. In the following analysis, we investigate the consequences
for the immigration quota and consequently wages, rental rate, profits and gov-
ernment welfare of the agenda setting country when the number of countries in
the Union is increased to N =  + 1. We will do this for the cases of symmetric
and asymmetric countries respectively. To simplify the dynamics, we will assume
that at the end of each period all workers return home to their native countries.
This simplifies the analysis in that there is no stock of immigrants to keep track
of across periods. Also, the government decision over immigration policy in any
given period is independent of the others, facilitating the comparison of outcomes
across periods. This exercise will enable us to see how the welfare of the different
groups are affected by Union expansion.
26
1.4.1 Symmetric countries
With N 2 M countries in the Union, lˆI1 is given by
lˆ I1 =

s + 1
4
2
1
4K 41
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
  N  
NX
j=2
l Ij (1.10)
Also, with N 2 M, total employment in country 1 is given by
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1 =

s + 1
4
2
1
6K 61
NP
j=1
j
2K 2j
2 (1.11)
From (1.11), we find that as the number of countries in the Union increases,
total employment in country 1 decreases. Consequently, wages increase, rents
decrease while government welfare increases with an increase in N. Equations
(1.10) and (1.11), when evaluated at N = , represent the immigration quota and
total labour employment in country 1 when the floor lI1 is reached.
We now analyze the consequences of an additional country joining the Union
such that the number of countries in the Union increases to N = ( + 1) but immi-
gration country of the agenda setter is at its floor ,lI1. Recall that the new member
country has the same TFP as the other countries in the Union.The result is sum-
marised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Assume countries are symmetrical in the sense 1 = 2 = ...
= M. If the immigration quota from the rest of the world for Country 1 reaches
a floor lI1 when there are N =  symmetric countries in the Union, then adding
the ( + 1)th country to the Union leads to employment and consequently wages
remaining unchanged at the levels that had been achieved when the floor was
reached. Profits and government welfare also stay at the same level.
Proof.
Detailed proof is in Appendix A.3.
The intuition can be explained as follows. When the ( + 1)th country enters
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the Union, lˆI1 stays at lˆ
I
1 as given by (1.10) (evaluated at N = ). Consequently, in
the presence of an additional country, and with an unchanged immigration quota,
total labor employment in country 1 is now given by
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1 =

s + 1
4
2
1
6K 61
P
j=1
j
2K 2j
+1P
j=1
j
2K 2j
+
1
2K 21
+1P
j=1
j
2K 2j
(1 + l I+1). (1.12)
To understand the effect of the additional country on total employment in coun-
try 1, we compare between employment in country 1 when there are  countries
in the Union (1.11) and when there are ( + 1) countries but lˆI1 = l
I
1. Since all the
countries are symmetric, with K1 = K2 = .... = K+1 = K and 1 = 2 = ... = +1 = ,
(1.11) becomes
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1


=

s + 1
4
2
2K 2
2
(1.13)
while (1.12) becomes
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1

+1
=

s + 1
4
2
2K 2
( + 1)
+
1
( + 1)
(1 + l I+1). (1.14)
We find that (1.13) and (1.14) are equal under our assumption that all coun-
tries in the Union have the same native population, normalized to 1, and the same
immigration quotas lˆI1 = l
I
2 = .... = l
I
+1.This implies that when symmetric countries
form a Union and lˆI1 reaches the floor l
I
1, total labor employment and consequently
wages do not change as a further country is introduced to the Union. This is
because, when countries are symmetric in all respects, there is no movement of
people under the FMP and since the immigration quota also cannot fall below the
floor, total employment does not change and consequently neither do wages.
The results stated in Proposition 2 enables us to conclude that in case of sym-
metric countries forming the Union, initially the political elite and rest of society
gain from Union expansion in terms of higher welfare and wages respectively. At
the same time, the economic elite loses. However once the quota reaches lI1, the
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gains to all groups do not change with further expansion of the Union.
1.4.2 Asymmetric countries
In this subsection we consider a situation when there are  asymmetric coun-
tries in a Union such that 1 > 2 > .... > . Similar to the analysis in the
previous section, we will now show what happens to the total employment and
hence wages in country 1 if the number of countries in the Union is increased to
N = ( + 1), after country 1 has already reached lI1. The additional country has a
lower TFP than the country which joined the Union prior to it. If there are N = 
countries in the Union, the immigration quota of country 1 from the ROW is given
by (as explained in the last section)
lˆ I1 =

s + 1
4
2
1
4K 41
P
j=1
j
2K 2j
    
X
j=2
l Ij (1.15)
Following this, total employment in country 1 when there are  countries in the
Union is
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1


=

s + 1
4
2
1
6K 61
P
j=1
j
2K 2j
2 = 12K 21P
j=1
j
2K 2j
h
(1 + lˆ I1) +
X
j=2
(1 + l Ij )
i
(1.16)
Suppose now N =  + 1 i.e. the ( + 1)th country is invited to join the Union.
The government of country 1 cannot lower the immigration quota below lI1. This
would lead to total employment in country 1 being expressed as
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜1

+1
=
1
2K 21
+1P
j=1
j
2K 2j
h
(1 + lˆ I1) +
X
j=2
(1 + l Ij ) + 1 + l
I
+1
i
(1.17)
The following proposition summarizes the effect of an additional country with
a lower TFP joining the Union, on country 1’s total employment, wages, profits
and government welfare.
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Proposition 3: Assume countries are asymmetrical in the sense 1 > 2 > ...
> M. If the immigration quota from the rest of the world for Country 1 reaches a
floor lI1 when there are N =  symmetric countries in the Union, then adding the
(+1)th country to the Union leads to higher employment and consequently lower
wages . Profits and government welfare increase.
Proof.
Details of the proof can be found in Appendices A.4 and A.5.
To explain the above proposition, we first compare between total labor employ-
ment when there are  countries (1.16) and when there are N = ( + 1) countries
but the floor lI1 has been reached. We already know that the numerators of (1.16)
and (1.17) are similar and
(1 + lˆ I1) +
X
j=2
(1 + l Ij ) + 1 + l
I
+1 > (1 + lˆ I1) +
X
j=2
(1 + l Ij ) (1.18)
We thus need to focus on the denominators. The denominator of (1.17) can
be written as
A = 21K
2
1 + 
2
2K
2
2 + .... + 
2
+1K
2
+1 (1.19)
while the denominator for (1.16) can be expressed as
B = 21K
2
1 + 
2
2K
2
2 + .... + 
2
K
2
 (1.20)
When +1 = 0, A = B. This implies for a given stock of capital, 1 + lˆI1 + l˜1

+1
>
1 + lˆI1 + l˜1


at +1 = 0. Since both A and B are continuous functions of , we can
always find some ¯+1 > 0 such that 8+1 2 [0, ¯+1], 1 + lˆI1 + l˜1

+1
> 1 + lˆI1 + l˜1


holds. Thus, we find that if a technologically inferior country wants to join a Union
where there are N countries which are more technologically advanced than itself
and if the country which is technologically the most advanced (i.e. the agenda
setter in our model) cannot lower its immigration quota below lI1, then country 1
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actually witnesses a rise in total employment and a consequent fall in wages.
The effect on wages and hence returns to the workers forming the rest of the
society is depicted in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Effect on Wages
N
Wages
  + 1
symmetric countries
asymmetric countries
floor
Next we compare between the profits of the entrepreneurs when there are
N =  countries in the Union and N = ( + 1) countries but immigration quota is at
lI1 . When there are  countries in the Union, net profits of the entrepreneurs are
given by
i(lˆ I1)


=
1
2
2i K
2
i
vuuuuuut
 
s+1
4
2 4i K 4i
P
j=1
j
2K 2j
P
j=1
j
2K 2j
(1.21)
With the entry of the ( + 1)th country in the Union, and if country 1 cannot
lower its immigration quota below lI1, the net profits of the entrepreneurs can be
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represented as
i(lˆ I1)

+1
=
1
2
2i K
2
i
vuuuuuut
 
s+1
4
2
41K
4
1 +
P
j=1
2j K
2
j (1 + l
I
+1)
+1P
j=1
2j K
2
j
P
j=1
2j K
2
j
(1.22)
We need to compare between (1.21) and (1.22). By inspection, the numerator
of (1.22) is greater than the numerator of (1.21) 8+1. We can also see that if
+1 = 0, the denominator of (1.21) is equal to the denominator of (1.22). Thus
under the assumption that +1 = 0, net profits are higher when there are N =
(+1) countries in the Union with the immigration quota being fixed at lI1 than when
there are N =  countries in the Union. Since profits are a continuous function
of +1, we can always find some ¯+1 > 0 such that 8+1 2 [0, ¯+1] profits to
entrepreneurs are higher when there are  + 1 countries than when there are 
countries. This implies that if a technologically inferior country is allowed into the
Union, and if country 1 cannot lower its immigration quota below a certain level,
then once that level is reached, the induction of new countries actually lead to
an increase in the profits of the entrepreneurs in country 1. The results of the
effect of Union expansion on the economic elite is represented in the following
diagram. Under asymmetric countries, the economic elite gains as membership
of the Union expands beyond the point where the quota has reached a floor. This
is shown in Figure 1.3.
Our final step is to compare the government welfare when there are N = 
countries in the Union and when there are N = ( + 1) countries but immigration
quota is at the floor lI1. When there are N = (   1) and N =  countries in the
Union, government welfare of country 1 can be expressed as respectively
GW (lˆ I1)

 1
=
 s + 1
2

1
2K 21
vuut(1 + lˆ I1) +  1X
j=2
(1 + l Ij )

=
 1X
j=1
j
2K 2j    lˆ I1 (1.23)
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Figure 1.3: Effect on Profits
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GW (lˆ I1)


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 s + 1
2

1
2K 21
vuut(1 + lˆ I1) + X
j=2
(1 + l Ij )

=
X
j=1
j
2K 2j    lˆ I1 (1.24)
For notational simplicity we will say that the immigration quota of country i
when there are  countries in the Union is lIi
0
. Using the first order conditions
for the government’s welfare maximization for the two cases and the result that
the immigration quota is lower when there are  countries than when there are
(   1) countries, if the government welfare has to be greater when there are
N =  countries than when there are N = (  1) countries in the Union for a given
stock of capital


2 + 2( ˆl I1
0   lˆ I1) + ... + 2(l I 1
0   l I 1) + 2l I
0
+ lˆ I1   ˆl I1
0
> 0 (1.25)
Since  > 0, it implies
(1 + l I
0
) >
lˆ I1   ˆl I1
0
2
+
 1X
j=2
(l Ij   l Ij
0
) (1.26)
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For given immigration quota of the other countries, this above condition can
be written as
2(1 + l I
0
) > lˆ I1   ˆl I1
0
(1.27)
Using the expressions for the optimal immigration quota for country i when
there are  and +1 countries in the Union, the condition can be further simplified
to
1 + l I
0
>

s + 1
4
2
41K
4
1
 1P
j=1
2j K
2
j

2K
2

P
j=1
2j K
2
j

(1.28)
The above condition implies that assuming N < , for given other parame-
ters, the larger is the proportion of entrepreneurs in the countries of the Union,
the less likely that government welfare will rise as the number of countries in the
Union increases. Similarly, for given values of other parameters, if the return to
immigrants () decreases, the it is also again less likely that government welfare
will rise as the number of countries increase. This is because if the net wage ()
is lower, then quota rent per immigrant rises. Thus, as the number of countries in
the Union increases, the immigration quota of country i decreases and hence the
loss of quota rent is higher for lower values of . This implies that for government
welfare to keep on increasing before a floor on the quota is reached, the propor-
tion of entrepreneurs in the population should be sufficiently small or the return
to migrants must be sufficiently high. We can always set underlying parameters
such that  will be sufficiently high.14
We now proceed to show that as the number of countries in the Union in-
crease from N =  to N = ( + 1), but the immigration quota of country 1 re-
mains unchanged at lI1, government welfare will still increase. This would imply
that throughout the expansion of the Union, irrespective of whether the floor is
reached or otherwise, the political elite will always gain. When there are N =  +1
14Detailed Proof in Appendix A.5
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countries, government welfare is
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But we know that the immigration quota under such a situation is fixed at the 
country level lI1. Thus, we just need to compare between the first terms of (1.24)
and (1.29). We know by inspection that the numerator of (1.29) is greater than
the numerator of (1.24). We an also see that if +1 = 0, the denominator of (1.29)
is equal to the denominator of (1.24). Thus under +1 = 0, government welfare is
higher when there are N = (+1) countries in the Union with the immigration quota
fixed at lI1 than when there are N =  countries in the Union. Since government
welfare is also a continuous function of +1, we can always find some ¯+1 > 0
such that 8+1 2 [0, ¯+1] government welfare is higher when there are N = (+1)
countries than when there are N =  countries. This implies that if a technolog-
ically inferior country is invited into the Union, and if country 1 cannot lower its
immigration quota beyond a certain level, then once that level is reached, the in-
duction of new countries still leads to an increase in the welfare of the government
in country 1.
Figure 1.4 summarizes the results of government welfare for symmetric and
asymmetric countries.
1.4.3 Order of Entry of Countries into the Union
We have assumed country 1 to be the agency setter such that it decides upon
which countries from the region would be invited to form the Union. We establish
that countries will be allowed to join the Union in a decreasing order of their TFPs.
Thus, country 1(with TFP 1) would first induct country 2 (with TFP 2) into the
Union and not country 3 (with TFP 3 where 3 < 2). This is described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4: Consider a particular 2 > 0. There exists a 3 2 (0,2) such that
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Figure 1.4: Effect on Government Welfare
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if 3 < 3, country 1 will prefer to induct country 2 over country 3 into the union.
Proof.
The formal proof of this proposition is relegated to appendix A.6. Here we dis-
cuss the intuition behind the result. Suppose the TFP in country 3 is low enough
such that the wage in the country is close to the rest of the world wage rate. This
implies that if country 1 first invites country 3 to join the Union, wage equalisation
would drive down the wage in country 1 close to the world wage rate. However,
this outcome could have been achieved by country 1 when it was a standalone
country (by allowing more immigration). But, we know by solving the optimisation
problem of a standalone country, that it chooses an immigration quota from the
rest of the world such that wages in the country remains higher than the world
wage rate. This implies that the welfare of country 1 is higher when it is a stan-
dalone country than when it is joined by country 3 in the Union, when country 3’s
TFP is below a certain threshold. At the same time, we know that the welfare
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of country 1 goes up when country 2 joins the Union, where country 2’s wage is
lower than country 1’s but higher than the world wage rate (implying higher than
country 3’s wages). Hence, we can infer that for a TFP of country 3 lower than
a certain threshold (and hence wages are very close to the world wage rate),
country 1 prefers to induct country 2 over country 3 into the Union.
1.5 Conclusion
In the case of symmetric countries forming a Union, the addition of more coun-
tries leads to a fall in total employment in the country, rise in wages, fall in en-
trepreneurial profits and a rise in government welfare. However, once a floor on
the immigration quota is reached, total employment, wages , profits as well as
government welfare no longer changes with the addition of further countries to
the Union. In the case of asymmetric countries forming the Union, addition of a
country which has lower TFP into the Union leads to a fall in wages and a rise
in profits and government welfare. Thus, at first, Union expansion benefits the
government and workers, but not entrepreneurs. However we have seen that,
after N =  is reached, further Union expansion benefits the government and the
entrepreneurs, while workers are made worse off. This is the sense in which we
see that initial Union expansion benefits the rest of society, but later switches to
benefiting the economic elite. It is the fact that the political elite benefits through-
out that motivates expansion throughout.This is the sense in which we conclude
that expansion of the Union transforms the FMP from being an inclusive into an
extractive institution.
The model and results obtained in this chapter could be used to throw light
on euroscepticism which seem to be gaining ground in various countries in the
European Union. The recent Brexit vote in the UK is one such instance where
natives felt threatened by the influx of East European immigrants and the conse-
quent downward pressure on wages. Similarly, there have been massive anti EU
protests in Rome. Italy was once considered to be one of the most pro EU coun-
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tries. However, people took to the streets to protest the ineffectiveness of the EU
in helping Italy deal with the large flow of immigrants into the country. Thus, over
time there has been a constant rise in anti EU sentiments which poses a threat
to the existence of an Union like the EU.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Institutions in
Determining Immigration and
Investment
2.1 Introduction
Immigration policy is determined by the interaction between the different groups
in society. On the one hand, under conditions of full employment and perfect
substitutability between native and migrant labor, increased immigration leads to
lower welfare of domestic labor through increased competition for jobs and hence,
lower wages. On the other hand, allowing immigration increases profits of capital
owners and in the process, increases investment in the economy. This implies
that in a democracy without institutions that tie a government’s hand, if the median
voter is from the working class, immigration would be minimal. Alternatively, in
a world where lobbying is possible, it is always tempting for the government to
move away from the median voter’s preferred outcome in response to pressure
from lobby groups, when taking into account its own political considerations.
This chapter shows that in a setting where entrepreneurs can lobby the gov-
ernment for a higher immigration quota and production is capital intensive, the
government’s welfare is inversely related to its bargaining power vis-a-vìs the
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lobby. Consequently, the levels of immigration and investment are determined ac-
cording to the strength of the bargaining power between the government and the
entrepreneurs. The greater is the bargaining power of the government, the larger
is the contribution it can induce from the lobby in order to relax immigration policy
and consequently, the lower will be the level of investment by the entrepreneurs
all else equal. We show how a government can potentially solve this underin-
vestment problem by tying its hands to an institution, whereby it would be able
to guarantee that immigration will be above a certain minimum level in the pres-
ence of lobbying activities. With a minimum level of immigration guaranteed by
the institution, incentives to invest increase and counteract the underinvestment
problem. This chapter presents a new framework within which the competing
forces determining immigration and investment interact through the institution to
determine both the level of immigration and capital formation.
We use a standard one sector model with two factors of production: labor and
capital. Production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale and there is
full employment of both the inputs. Society is divided into three groups: labor, en-
trepreneurs and government. Workers earn their marginal product and increased
immigration lowers their wages. The entrepreneurs are firm as well as capital
owners. This means they earn profits as well as rental returns on capital. They
decide how much capital to invest in production and benefit from having more
immigrant labor, as higher labor supply lowers the cost of production through
lower wages. The government chooses an immigration policy in terms of an im-
migration quota, after taking into account the interests of all groups in the society
including its own. The government welfare function is a weighted average of the
total welfare of the inhabitants and the contributions it receives from the lobbies.
This feature of the model is adopted from the framework of Grossman and Help-
man (1994). In order to influence the government’s decision making process, the
entrepreneurs form a lobby. The lobby’s contribution to the government is condi-
tional on the openness of the immigration policy. This contribution is determined
through the process of bargaining between the government and the lobby. Immi-
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gration policy is endogenously determined as a result of the conflicting choices
between the government and entrepreneurs.
Following Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), we model the policy formation
process as a two-stage game between the government and the lobby. In the first
stage, the entrepreneurs maximize their profits to determine the amount of capital
they want to invest in the production process. They do so anticipating the level
of immigration and contributions that will be decided by the bargaining process
in the second stage. In the second stage, the government and the lobby engage
in Nash bargaining whereby their joint surplus is maximized to determine the
level of immigration into the economy. Following that, the surplus that arises from
lobbying is shared between the government and the lobby according to their given
bargaining powers. This consequently leads to the determination of the optimal
contribution schedule for the lobbyists. From this, the level of immigration, capital
stock and contributions are determined.
The characterization of the political equilibrium and hence the behavior of the
various agents is central to the contribution of this chapter. The government has
to formulate immigration policy in such a way that it is able to balance the interests
of the various agents in the society against its own. We set up a benchmark in
which the government is not allowed to take contributions from the lobby. As a re-
sult, we can think of the outcome as ‘pure democracy’ because the government is
responding only to the interests of the voters. We will first show that the outcome
corresponds to the planner’s solution. We then compare, with this benchmark,
the outcome when the government is able to accept contributions by the lobby.
This leads to a political equilibrium where the government’s utility is always higher
than under pure democracy due not only to the contributions that the government
receives from the lobby, but also because the investment level is higher. Native
labor tends to suffer a welfare loss in such an equilibrium as compared to pure
democracy because wages are pushed down due to greater immigration. This
comparison reveals the tensions between the different groups.
Once in a political equilibrium, if production technology is relatively capital in-
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tensive, the government’s utility is a decreasing function of its bargaining power.
This is because a change in the bargaining power of the government has two
opposing effects on its utility. On the one hand, for a given stock of capital, an in-
crease in the bargaining power directly increases the amount of contributions from
the lobby to the government and hence increases utility to the government. On
the other hand, increased bargaining power translates into lower capital invest-
ment and consequently the immigration level and hence contributions decrease,
reducing the government’s utility. This latter effect is greater the more capital
intensive the production process is. Thus, if production is sufficiently capital in-
tensive, the second effect outweighs the first and as the bargaining power of the
government increases, the government actually suffers a loss in its welfare.
The final part of the chapter argues that if the government is sufficiently strong
vis-a-vís the lobby, it would prefer to tie its hands by an institution which guaran-
tees a minimum level of immigration. This would enable a strong government to
neutralise the problem of underinvestment. Such an institution could be the Eu-
ropean Union (EU). In order to become a part of such an institution, a country
has to satisfy certain conditions encompassing the rule of law, stable democracy
and free market economy (Copenhagen Criteria). Becoming a part of such an
institution involves certain costs. Thus, negotiations also take place regarding the
financial arrangements i.e. how much a country needs to pay to become a part
of the Union and how much they receive from the EU’s budget.1. However, once
a country becomes a part of the EU, it is subject to the Free Movement of Per-
sons clause and hence entrepreneurs of that country can avail of workers from
whom the government cannot extract a quota rent and those who do not require a
visa sponsorship. This implies that the entrepreneurs now has access to a larger
labour force without incurring any specific cost. The theoretical model in the final
part of the chapter is a stylised way of capturing this feature.
This chapter contributes to the strand of literature that deals with the demand
for immigrants which can be traced back to Benhabib (1996). He shows that in
an economy under majority voting, the median voter tends to choose immigrants
1In 2014, UK paid £11.34 billion euros to the EU budget
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whose skills are complimentary to those of the natives. Hence, this imposes cer-
tain capital and skill requirements on potential migrants. Ortega (2005) extends
Benhabib’s work to a dynamic framework whereby children of immigrants’ are
allowed voting rights. Consequently, skill complementary immigration policy re-
sults in a shift in political power. Thus, there exists a trade off between current
and future immigration policy. Following Benhabib and Ortega, this chapter also
analyses the formulation of immigration policy by the government of a destination
country. However, we incorporate the role of an interest group and institutions in
constraining immigration policy.
Two papers to which the present work is closely related are the ones by Fac-
chini and Willman (2005) and Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998). Facchini and
Willman address the issue of the role of interest groups in formulating govern-
ment policies on factor movements. The organized sector lobby the government
for increased protection by offering contributions. They use a two stage game
between the lobby and the government in the form of a menu auction. They find
that protection granted is not only higher for a lobbying than a non-lobbying factor,
but also higher for a factor that is abundant in the domestic country. They also
show that a factor has incentives to lobby against the protection of its comple-
ment. This is because allowing greater imports of its complement will enhance
the lobbying factor’s marginal product. Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare, in the con-
text of international trade, investigate whether the presence of lobbies induce a
government to tie its hands to a free trade agreement. In a small two country two
sector model, they use a two stage game involving the government and the lobby
to establish the conditions under which the government is worse off in a political
equilibrium than under a free trade agreement. In our present work, we develop a
model that studies a government’s policy formation on international factor move-
ments in line with Facchini and Willman, combined with the bargaining framework
of Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare. We show how immigration policy can determine
the investment level in an economy. That is, we show that policy on an inter-
nationally mobile factor (which is labor in our case) can influence the formation
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of the complementary factor (capital) which is not internationally mobile. In that
case, lack of commitment on the government’s part can lead to the problem of
under-investment. We then identify a type of institution to which the government
can tie its hands to solve this under-investment problem and the conditions under
which a government would rather tie its hand to such an institution than formulate
policy in the absence of such an institution.
The chapter is organized in the following way. The next section, section 2.2
sets out the analytical framework, outlining the benchmark social planner’s prob-
lem, and the government’s welfare function under the cases of a pure democracy
and political equilibrium. Section 2.3 discusses the role of institutions and estab-
lishes conditions under which a government would prefer to tie its hands to an
institution in the presence of pressure groups. Section 2.4 provides a preliminary
numerical analysis of the results, while Section 2.5 which concludes the chapter
provides a brief discussion of the main findings of the chapter and directions for
future research.
2.2 The Model
The economy consists of one sector with two factors of production, labor (L) and
capital (K).2 We consider a production function of the form Q = K
p
L such that
 + 12 < 1.
3 Thus, the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
The economy consists of a fixed number of domestic workers and entrepreneurs
(entrepreneurs). The entrepreneurs are firm owners as well as capital owners.
These firms are competitive and they are price takers in the goods and factor
market.4 The mass of the domestic labor force is normalized to 1 while that of
the entrepreneurs is normalized to s (s < 1). Thus, total mass of the population
2We assume that this economy is a small country in the world economy
3The main results of the model will still hold for a more general production function of the form
Q = KL where  +  < 1.
4Since firms are competitive, the production function should exhibit non-increasing returns to
scale. Assuming decreasing returns is without loss of generality as it is similar to assuming a
constant returns to scale production function with labor, capital and another fixed factor which is
distributed evenly among the entrepreneurs in the country and the net returns after paying labor
and capital accrues entirely to this fixed factor.
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in the economy is (1 + s). We also assume that both workers and entrepreneurs
(as owners of capital) earn their marginal products. This implies that the factor
markets are competitive. Thus, r = K 1
p
L and w = 12
Kp
L
where, L = 1 + lI. lI
is the domestic quota of immigrant labor into the economy and this is the main
policy variable of the government.
The entrepreneurs not only own the capital, but they also form a group which
lobbies for more immigrant labor. More labor is beneficial for firm owners since
it translates into lower wages and higher profits for them. Assuming the price of
the final good to be 1 and entrepreneurs to be homogeneous, gross profits of the
entrepreneurs are given by
 = K
p
L  rK  wL
= K
p
L  K 1
p
LK  1
2
Kp
L
L
= (
1
2
  )K
p
L
(2.1)
Assuming unit cost of installing capital ( e.g. equipment), the net income of
entrepreneurs, is given by
(lI) = (lI) + r (lI)K   K (2.2)
It is assumed that domestic workers and immigrants are perfect substitutes for
each other. Entry of more immigrant labor will tend to push down domestic wages,
and thus hurt domestic workers. On the other hand, lower wages increase profits
of the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs can lobby the government for more immigra-
tion by making a financial contribution. On the one hand, the government needs
to balance between the conflicting interests of its citizens i.e, the workers and the
entrepreneurs, but on the other, it values the financial contribution made by the
entrepreneurs. We assume that the world wage rate is fixed at w. Immigration
will take place into the country as long as immigrants get a higher wage than the
world wage. The model is set up in such a way that the quota of immigration
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is always binding in equilibrium. The government captures only part of the sur-
plus from immigration while a fixed amount  is retained by the immigrant. Thus,
government acquires (w(lI)  w   ) as quota rent per immigrant.5
The national welfare from the perspective of a benevolent social planner is
written as
SW (lI) = s

(lI) + r (lI)K   K

+ w(lI)1 + (w(lI)  w   )lI (2.3)
From the above expression, we can see that the social planner’s welfare is a
weighted sum of entrepreneurs’ and labor’s income. The weights are according
to the population share of each group in the economy. We assume that this is a
planner for the home country, and does not take into account the welfare of people
in the rest of the world. The social planner chooses lI and capital investment
simultaneously to maximise the social welfare of the economy.
The government welfare function (or, the government’s objective function) is
a weighted average of the total welfare of the inhabitants and the contributions it
receives from the lobbies. It can be written as
GW = s

(lI) + r(lI)K  K

+ w(lI)1 + (w(lI)  w   )lI + ac(lI)lI
= SW(lI) + ac(lI)lI
(2.4)
The government places a constant weight a > 0 on the contributions it re-
ceives from the lobby. We assume that under pure democracy, the government
is not allowed to receive any contributions from the lobby by an institutional con-
straint and hence c = 0 while under a political equilibrium it is allowed to receive
5The fact that immigrants’ earnings are effectively lower than natives can be explained by
the visa costs and NHS surcharge payable by immigrants into UK from outside the EU. Health
surcharge introduced on 6th April 2015 is £200 per year for temporary non EEA migrants and
£150 per year for non EEA students. Revenue collected from NHS surcharge between 6th April
2015-14th March 2016 by the UK government is £175.6m. Also, Home Office income from visa
and immigration has been £1086m and £1182m for the years 2015-16 and 2016-17 respectively.
Similarly in France, non EEA migrants without work do not have access to benefits unlike those
guaranteed to EU national without a job (since these are guaranteed by the EU in order to stan-
dardise social security systems in member countries). Also, income support for pensioners is
available to non EEA nationals only is they have worked in France for ten years.
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contributions.
We set up a two stage game. In the first stage, the entrepreneurs decide how
much capital to invest in the production process. In the second stage, the govern-
ment and the lobby engage in bargaining to determine the level of immigration to
be allowed into the economy and contributions. Following Maggi and Rodríguez-
Clare (1998), negotiation takes place in the form of Nash bargaining where the
government and the lobby have  and 1   bargaining powers respectively.
2.2.1 Benchmark Social Planners’ Problem
The benchmark case is the optimization decision of the social planner. The plan-
ner chooses the immigration quota and stock of capital simultaneously by max-
imising his welfare function. From the expression of the social welfare function
described above, the first order condition is
 
1 + s
2
!
K 
p
1 + lI   (w + )lI = 0 (2.5)
We will denote the solutions to the social planner’s problem with superscript
‘SP’ for the corresponding variables. The maximization problem yields L=1+ lSPI =
1+s
4
2
K2
(w+)2 as the optimal labor requirement for the economy. Thus, the level of
immigration in the benchmark case is given by
lSPI =
 
1 + s
4
!2
K 2
(w + )2
  1 (2.6)
We find that the larger is the mass of entrepreneurs in the total population (s),
the higher will be the immigration quota from the rest of the world (lSPI ). However,
the higher is the world wage rate, the lower will be the immigration into the econ-
omy since the difference between the domestic and world wages will decrease,
leading to a lower incentive for foreign workers to migrate. Also, the higher is the
amount immigrants can earn () in the country, lower will be lSPI . Consequently, at
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this level of immigration, wages will be
wSP =
2(w + )
1 + s
(2.7)
For  > 0 and s < 1, this wage rate is higher than the prevailing world wage
rate. Since the social planner chooses the level of investment simultaneously with
the quota, maximization of the social welfare function ((2.3)) yields investment in
the economy to be
K SP =
"
(1 + s)2
8s(w + )
# 1
1 2
(2.8)
We find that capital investment is directly proportional to the share of capital in
the production process and the mass of entrepreneurs in the economy. However
the higher is the world wage rate and the return to the immigrant, the lower will
be the investment in the economy.
2.2.2 Pure Democracy
We proceed to consider the situation when the government sets policy on immi-
gration. Under pure democracy the government is constrained such that it is not
allowed to accept financial contributions from entrepreneurs. Using superscript
‘D’ to denote variables under pure democracy, the government’s welfare function
in such a situation can be written as -
GWD(lI) = s

(lI) + r (lI)K   K

+ w(lI)1 + (w(lI)  w   )lI (2.9)
Combined with observations from the previous section, we find the following
result
Proposition 1: In a pure democracy, immigration quota and investment levels
are lower than that of the social planner.
Proof.
Using the structural expressions for entrepreneurs’ profits, rental rate and do-
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mestic wages to maximise the government’s welfare function with respect to the
quota lI, we obtain the expression for the immigration quota under pure democ-
racy and it is given by
lDI =
 
1 + s
4
!2
K 2
(w + )2
  1 (2.10)
Thus, for a given stock of capital investment, the higher is the weight the gov-
ernment puts on entrepreneurs’ income, the higher is the immigration quota from
the rest of the world. However, a net wage to immigrants (w + ) leads to lower
immigration quota. The wages under democracy is
wD =
2(w + )
1 + s
(2.11)
The higher the weight on the entrepreneur’s income, the lower are the wages
in pure democracy. The total income of entrepreneurs under pure democracy is
given by
(lDI ) = (l
D
I ) + r (l
D
I )K   K (2.12)
Anticipating the government’s choice of the level of immigration, the entrepreneurs
maximise their total income in the first stage by deciding the level of capital they
would want to invest:
KD =
"
(1 + s)
4(w + )
# 1
1 2
(2.13)
The higher is the weight on entrepreneur’s income, the greater is capital in-
vestment in the first stage, while a higher world wage rate and quota rent has a
negative impact on such investment. However, the higher the intensity of cap-
ital in the production process, captured by , the greater is the investment by
entrepreneurs.
We now compare the capital investment and quota under pure democracy to
the ones derived under the social planner’s problem. Since s < 1, direct compu-
tation enables us to conclude that investment under the planner given by 2.8 is
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larger than investment in a pure democracy shown by 2.13. Given this result and
values of all other parameters, immigration quota under a planner shown by 2.6
is greater than the quota in pure democracy (2.10).
The social planner chooses an immigration quota and capital investment si-
multaneously by maximizing its welfare. This implies that there are no entrepreneurs
who make investment decisions. However, in a pure democracy, the government
chooses lDI after entrepreneurs have decided upon a level of investment. This may
lead to underinvestment in pure democracy as entrepreneurs solely care about
their total income, unlike a social planner.
2.2.3 Political Equilibrium
In our analysis of Political Equilibrium, we relax the assumption that the govern-
ment cannot accept financial contributions. The entrepreneurs lobby the govern-
ment to increase the quota of immigrant labor since more workers will push down
wages in the economy, increasing profits. Under political equilibrium, the govern-
ment has to strike a balance between the demands of its citizens and the utility it
receives from the contributions by the lobby. The government weighs the returns
to the domestic laborers and entrepreneurs as under pure democracy, but now
also places a weight on the contributions it receives. Thus, in the first stage, the
entrepreneurs choose the amount of capital to invest while in the second stage,
the lobby and the government share the surplus generated from moving to a polit-
ical equilibrium according to their bargaining powers. This consequently leads to
the determination of the immigration quota and contributions. We use the method
of backward induction to solve for the political equilibrium. In the second stage,
the government and the lobby bargain on the level of immigration to be allowed
and the contributions. We will use the superscript ‘PE’ to denote solutions for
corresponding variables in political equilibrium. The results from this stage is
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In the second stage of a political equilibrium, for a given stock of
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capital, the immigration quota in an economy depends positively on the degree
of responsiveness of the government to pressure from the lobby and also on the
level of capital investment. The contribution from the lobby to the government is
larger, the higher is the capital investment. Also, the greater is the bargaining
power of the government, the larger contributions it will be able to extract from the
lobby.
Proof.Detailed derivation is shown in Appendix B.1
The steps and intuition behind the proposition is as follows. The immigration
quota lPEI maximizes the joint surplus of the government and the lobby, repre-
sented as
JS = GW(lI) + a

s
 
(lI) + r(lI)K  K
  c(lI)lI
= s

(lI) + r(lI)K  K

+ w(lI)1 + (w(lI)  w   )lI + as

(lI) + r(lI)K  K

=
s
2
K
p
1 + lI +
1
2
K
p
1 + lI   (w + )lI + as2 K

p
1 + lI   s(1 + a)K
=
s(1 + a)
2
K
p
1 + lI +
1
2
K
p
1 + lI   (w + )lI   s(1 + a)K
(2.14)
In political equilibrium, the optimal level of immigration that maximizes the joint
surplus function is
lPEI =
K 2
16(w + )2
h
1 + k(1 + a)
i2
  1 (2.15)
From inspection we see that as the world wage rate w increases, the level
of immigration into the country decreases. Similarly, if immigrants can earn more
in the country, the quota for immigrants falls. Also, the higher is the responsive-
ness of the government to political pressures, the higher is the immigration quota
that maximizes JS. Comparing lPEI and l
D
I using (2.15) and (2.10), we find that
the quota under a political equilibrium is higher than under pure democracy, for a
given stock of capital investment. This is because entrepreneurs can now influ-
ence the policy making process to increase the quota by making contributions to
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the government.
The utility of the government under pure democracy is the social welfare un-
der democracy denoted by GWD(lDI ) = SW
D(lDI ). Under the political equilibrium,
the government’s payoff becomes GWPE = SWPE(lPEI ) + ac(l
PE
I )l
PE
I . Similarly under
pure democracy, the lobby’s payoff can be represented as ((lDI )+r(l
D
I )K) while in a
political equilibrium the lobby’s pay off becomes ((lPEI )+r(l
PE
I )K c(lPEI )lPEI ). Under
Nash Bargaining, the government and the lobby share the surplus obtained from
the increased immigration according to their bargaining powers. The weighted
product of the surplus that arises from a political equilibrium to the government
and entrepreneurs, with the bargaining powers as corresponding weights, is de-
noted by B. Contributions are chosen such that B is maximized.
B =

SWD(lI) SWPE(lPEI )  ac(lPEI )lPEI


(lPEI ) + r(l
PE
I )K  K  c(lPEI )lPEI   (lDI )  r(lDI )K + K
1  (2.16)
This yields a total contribution schedule
c(lPEI )l
PE
I =
(1  )(SWD(lDI )  SW PE (lPEI ))
a
+ 

(lPEI ) + r (l
PE
I )K   (lDI )  r (lDI )K

(2.17)
When the government is very strong, depicted by a bargaining power  =
1, the contributions that the entrepreneurs will have to pay is exactly equal to
the difference in their surplus as the economy moves from pure democracy to a
political equilibrium. Thus, the government will be able to extract all the surplus
of the lobbyists as the latter lobby for more immigrant labor. On the other hand,
if the government is very weak i.e.  = 0 and all the bargaining power is with the
lobby, the amount of contributions that the government can get will just be enough
to compensate it for the difference in social welfare between a political equilibrium
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and pure democracy. We get the expression for optimal total contributions as
c(lPEI )l
PE
I =
sK 2
16(w + )
h
2a + as(1  )
i
(2.18)
The stronger is the government portrayed by a higher , the greater is the con-
tribution it can extract from the lobby. Also, the greater the responsiveness of the
government to political pressures, the greater is the amount of the contributions
that the lobby will be willing to provide the government to influence the latter’s
immigration policy.
In the first stage, anticipating the levels of immigration and contributions that
will be decided through bargaining between the government and the lobby, the
entrepreneurs decide on the level of capital they want to invest in the production
process. The result that we obtain is as follows.
Proposition 3: The higher is the bargaining power of the government, the lower
will be the capital investment by entrepreneurs in the first stage as the government
will be able to extract relatively large contributions from the lobby.
Proof.Detailed derivation is in appendix B.2.
Entrepreneurs choose the level of capital stock, anticipating the level of im-
migration and contributions. The net income of the entrepreneurs under political
equilibrium is given by
(lPEI ) = (l
PE
I ) + r (l
PE
I )K   c(lPEI )lPEI   K (2.19)
The difference in the net income from the pure democracy case is that now
the entrepreneurs also have to account for the contributions that they pay to the
government. Maximizing the profit function by choosing capital stock, after sub-
stituting the values of optimal immigration level and contributions under political
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equilibrium yields optimal investment
K PE =
"

8(w + )
h
2(1 + s(1 + a))  s[2a + as(1  )]
i# 11 2
(2.20)
We can conclude that capital investment is inversely related to the bargaining
power of the government, that is, the stronger is the government, the lower will
be the investment by entrepreneurs.
This can be interpreted in terms of a commitment problem on behalf of the
government. The lobby and the government enter into a negotiation that yields
both of them a higher return than that under pure democracy. However, the lobby
knows that once it has made an investment, it has to share the gross returns from
such investment with the government. Consequently, since bargaining powers
are known to each group, if the government has a higher bargaining power, en-
trepreneurs will deliberately invest less since they know that a greater portion of
their returns post negotiation will accrue to the government. However, the greater
is the responsiveness of the government to political pressure from the lobby, the
greater is the level of capital investment in the first stage.
2.2.4 Comparing GovernmentWelfare in Pure Democracy and
Political Equilibrium
We are now in a position to compare between government’s welfare (utility) under
pure democracy and political equilibrium and shed light on the government’s deci-
sion to commit to an institution. Using results from the previous sections enables
us to establish the following result.
Proposition 4: The government’s own welfare is lower in pure democracy com-
pared to a political equilibrium. However, higher level of welfare for the govern-
ment in political equilibrium decreases with the increase in its bargaining power,
when production is relatively capital intensive. Entrepreneurs’ welfare also in-
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creases in a political equilibrium. However, welfare of workers is higher under
pure democracy compared to a political equilibrium.
Proof.
Details of the derivation can be found in Appendix B.3.
To gain further insight, the government’s welfare function is the same as the
social welfare function under pure democracy and is given by
GWD =
1 + s
2

K 
q
1 + lDI   (w + )lDI   sK (2.21)
Given the expressions for immigration level (2.10) and stock of capital invest-
ment ((2.13)), we can rewrite the government’s welfare function as
GWD =
1 + s
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Similarly, under political equilibrium, government welfare function can be rep-
resented as,
GWPE = s((lPEI ) + r(l
PE
I )K + w(l
PE
I ) + (w(l
PE
I )  w   )lPEI + ac(lPEI )lPEI
=
1 + s
2

K
q
1 + lPEI   (w + )lPEI + ac(lPEI )lPEI
(2.23)
Given the value of optimal immigration level ((2.15)), capital investment ((2.20))
and contributions, the government welfare function under political equilibrium can
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rewritten as
GWPE =
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(2.24)
Subsequent analysis of the government welfare functions under pure democ-
racy (2.22) and political equilibrium (2.24) reveals that welfare of domestic work-
ers will always be higher in pure democracy than under a political equilibrium.
The intuition behind this is as follows. In the political equilibrium, the government
extracts rent from the lobby through contributions. Thus, compared to the situ-
ation of pure democracy, the government has an additional tool to extract rents.
This explains the result.6
However, government’s utility in political equilibrium will always be greater than
government’s utility under pure democracy. However, for a certain range of capital
intensity, , the government’s utility under political equilibrium will be a decreasing
function of . In other words, if capital is very important in the production process,
i.e.
2a(1 + k) + 2a2k(1  )  a2k2(1  )
2
h
(1 + k)2 + 2a(1 + k) + a2k(2  k )
i <  < 1
2
(2.25)
the greater (lower) the bargaining power of the government, the less (more)
will be the utility it will derive from committing to a political equilibrium.
This outcome comprises of two effects. On the one hand, as  decreases (in-
6This conclusion generally to hold in models adopting the framework of Grossman and Help-
man (1994). They develop a model where a special interest group in order to incumbent gov-
ernment’s choice of trade policy, make political contributions. Government’s objective is de-
fined over these contributions and voter’s welfare. Subsequent empirical analysis by Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) finds that government does have campaign contributions in its objective func-
tion. Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2012) also empirically validate the predictions of the
Grossman-Helpman model.
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creases), for a given stock of capital, contributions decrease (increase). This has
a downward (upward) effect on the government’s utility. On the other hand, as 
decreases(increases), capital investment increases(decreases) and through this
change in capital investment, rental rate, wage rate, immigration level as well as
contribution increases (decreases). This again leads to a rise (fall) in the govern-
ment’s utility. However, the second effect, due to , depends on the intensity of
capital in the production process, . If capital is very important in the production
process, the increase (decrease) in the government’s welfare due to a decrease
(increase) in its bargaining power outweighs the loss (gain) in its welfare due
to a fall (rise) in contributions and hence government welfare shows an overall
increase (decrease). Subsequently, if capital intensity is low, the government’s
utility increases with an increase in its bargaining power. Under a political equilib-
rium the welfare of entrepreneurs in terms of their total income will be higher than
in pure democracy.
Figure 2.1 represents the welfare differences. Thus, given a production pro-
cess where capital is of a very high intensity but the government has a higher
bargaining power, investors will be held up leading to underinvestment.
2.3 The Role of Institutions
This far we have demonstrated that a relatively strong government experiences
a reduction in welfare in a political equilibrium due to underinvestment by en-
trepreneurs. Hence, a natural question to ask is whether the government is able
to solve this underinvestment problem by adhering to an institution. Here we
will focus on an institution whereby the government can pre-commit to a certain
minimum level of immigration. We identify the kind of institutions a government
could commit to. To formally address this issue we now introduce a stage 0 to our
above described model, where the government can commit to a particular level
of immigration.
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Figure 2.1: Pure Democracy and Political Equilibrium

Govt welfare
GWD
GWPE
In the original political equilibrium, the threat point was that under pure democ-
racy. In the new set-up, we assume that the threat point is above democracy, i.e.
in stage 0, the government commits to allow more people to come in than under
pure democracy, without taking any contributions from the lobby. In other words,
the level of immigration now allowed is such that the total labor employment is
2LD where   1, that is, the new threat point is a scaled up version of the level
under pure democracy. Also, by assumption the government has to incur a cer-
tain cost for tying its hands to an institution and that cost is proportional to the
scaling up factor  (this is similar to assuming that the cost is a proportion of the
capital stock in the economy since the higher is the , the higher will be the capital
investment). The game is again solved by backward induction. We will now show
that if the government can commit to a floor i.e. a level of immigration higher than
that assured under pure democracy, then it will do so only if it’s bargaining power
is greater than a certain threshold. In other words, a government will prefer to tie
its hands by an institution when it is relatively strong vis-a-vìs the lobby.
As outlined in the previous section, GWPE is the welfare from the political equi-
librium in the situation when the government does not tie its hands to any insti-
58
tution. Let GWPEi be the welfare to the government from the political equilibrium
under the situation when in stage 0 the government ties its hands to an institution
by choosing a certain . The cost of tying hands is 2Q where Q > 0. Thus
NGWPEi is the net welfare to the government if it prefers to tie its hands to the
institution. We now define
NGW  = max

NGW PEi = max

[GW PEi   2Q]
The results obtained from our analysis is summarized in the following propo-
sition:.
Proposition 5: If a government is strong vis-a-vìs the lobby such that its bar-
gaining power is above a certain threshold, then it will prefer to tie its hands to
an institution. Commitment to such an institution will increase the welfare of the
government and it would be able to counteract the underinvestment problem that
would arise in the absence of such an institution.
Figure 2.2: Institutions

Govt welfare
GWD
GWPE
NGW
0 ¯
signs up to institution
Proof.
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The detailed mathematical proof can be found in Appendix B.4 while Figure
2.2 depict the values of  for which the government will be willing to sign up to
an institution. Here we discuss the intuition behind the proof. We find that when
the government is very weak relative to the lobby i.e.  = 0, its welfare from a
political equilibrium after committing to an institution is strictly lower than its wel-
fare under a political equilibrium without an institution. We find that the reverse
happens when the government is very strong vis-a-vìs the lobby i.e.  = 1. Since
the government welfare functions are continuous in the government’s bargaining
strength, we can conclude that for a government whose relative strength vis-a-
vìs the lobby is above a certain threshold (¯), the government would actually like
to tie its hands to the institution rather than stay in a political equilibrium without
such institutions. In the absence of such an institution, a government with a high
bargaining power would extract a lot of contribution from the lobby which would
deter entrepreneurs from undertaking investment, leading to underinvestment in
the economy. However once a strong government signs up to such an institution,
it is able to counteract such underinvestment problem without lowering its contri-
butions. This is because such an institution assures a higher level of immigration
into the economy without lobbying activities. The government’s commitment to
a larger immigration quota encourages the entrepreneurs to increase investment
and hence, makes the government better off in a political equilibrium arising out
of tying its hands to such an institution.
2.4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we undertake a numerical exercise to further understand the rela-
tionship between the government’s bargaining power  and its welfare for different
different levels of capital intensity. We also explore these effects when the mass
of entrepreneurs (s) in the economy changes and when the degree of respon-
siveness of the government to contributions from the lobby (a). We have already
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Figure 2.3: Low responsiveness to contributions, s=0.2
proved in subsection (2.4) that in a political equilibrium, if capital is very important
int he production process, then the government’s welfare actually decreases with
an increase in its bargaining power. This is primarily because, at higher values of
, the increase in welfare due to contributions is outweighed by the loss in welfare
due to fall in investment, rental and wage rates, quota and the indirect effect on
contributions. The numerical analysis confirms this relationship.
Figure 2.3 shows how government’s welfare changes with  for various values
of . In this exercise, we fix the mass of entrepreneurs (s) and government’s
responsiveness to contributions from the lobby (a) at 0.2 and 0.8 respectively.7.
We observe that as the value of  varies from 0.20 (low) to 0.48 (very high), the
slope of the government welfare function changes from being positive to negative.
Following this, we investigate how across this range of  government welfare
responds to changes in s and a. In Figure 2.4 and 2.5, we increase the mass
of entrepreneurs in the economy to 0.5 and 0.8 respectively, while keeping the
government responsiveness to contributions constant at a lower value of 0.8 as in
Figure 2.3. We find that, as s increases, the slope of the welfare function becomes
7Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), McCalman
(2004),and Lai and Yan (2012) among others, the estimated weight that the Government of the
United States places on campaign contributions is between 0.000315 and 1.33.
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negative at a lower value of . This implies that, with a remaining constant, an
increase in s exacerbates the underinvestment problem in the economy due to
which government welfare becomes negatively related to  at a lower . This is
reflected in the second diagrams across Figure 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. According to our
model, this implies that the fall in welfare due to decreased investment, wages,
rents, quota and contributions brought about by an increase in  outweighs the
rise in welfare due to increased contributions.
In the next three figures, we analyse the effect on government welfare for
the same range of  but now we assume that the government’s responsive to
contributions from the lobby is very high (1.3). We find that as s increases from
0.2 to 0.5 and then 0.8 as shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 respectively, the
value of  at which the government’s welfare becomes negatively related to  is
higher. This is because the increase in welfare brought about by an increase in
contributions outweighs the decrease in welfare brought about by an increase in
 for a larger range of . The government derives increasing welfare from valuing
contributions more. In these three figures we find that welfare becomes negatively
sloped for =0.33 while when a was constant at a lower value of 0.8, government
welfare starts decreasing with  when =0.23.
Figure 2.4: Low responsiveness to contributions, s=0.5
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Figure 2.5: Low responsiveness to contributions, s=0.8
Figure 2.6: High responsiveness to contributions, s=0.2
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Figure 2.7: High responsiveness to contributions, s=0.5
Figure 2.8: High responsiveness to contributions, s=0.8
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter explains how immigration policy is endogenously determined in a set
up where the government is concerned not only about its citizens but also about
contributions it can get from the lobby. The lobby formed by the entrepreneurs
invest capital in the production process depending on the immigration quota de-
cided upon by the government. The interaction between the government and
the lobby is modelled as a two stage game involving Nash bargaining where the
surplus arising from increased immigration is shared between the government
and the lobby according to their respective bargaining powers. We find that a
government, when considering its own welfare, is always better off in a political
equilibrium than in a pure democracy. However, if the government is very strong
relative to the lobby, the resulting underinvestment problem may become particu-
larly acute. Such a problem can be overcome by the government tying its hands
to an institution that guarantees a certain level of immigration into the economy.
In this chapter we are able to prove the existence of a threshold level of bar-
gaining power of the government such that for any bargaining power higher than
that level, the government will prefer to tie its hands to such an institution than
stay away from it. One possible direction of future research could be to analyse
the formation of immigration policy in the presence of multiple skill levels of the
workers.
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Chapter 3
Public Goods and Immigration:
England and Wales
3.1 Introduction
The way immigrants distribute themselves within a country can have important
implications for policy design and welfare. There are various factors which can
drive the location choice of an immigrant, such as job opportunities, political and
religious freedom, education opportunities, medical facilities and crime levels. Al-
though it is often reported that immigrants chose to cluster themselves with exist-
ing immigrants of the same community due to social ties, it is however important
to understand the role and magnitude of other factors impacting this decision.
Specifically, we analyse the role of public good provision in influencing the loca-
tional choice of an immigrant.1
In this paper, we investigate whether an increase in the number as well as
quality of schools had an effect on the location choice of immigrants. We exploit
the exogenous variation provided by the Academies Act which was introduced in
England in 2010. The introduction of this Act led to an increase in the number
1A public good is one which is non-excludable implying that individuals cannot be excluded
from using it and which is non rival meaning that use by one individual does not reduce availability
to others. Education is a public good that has positive externalities. It is non rival up to a point
since extra students do not reduce the space available to others. It is also semi non-excludable
as fees may be such that non-paying consumers cannot use it. Technology borne education such
as online courses and MOOCs are also non rival and non-excludable.
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of schools in the country (free schools) as well as a betterment in the quality of
schools who opted for academy status as academies enjoyed greater autonomy
in their functioning. We undertake two distinct approaches on different datasets
in this paper to answer the aforementioned question.
First, we explore the role of the Academies Act in the location decision of im-
migrants by comparing the stock of migrants to the North West region of England
(where the Act came into effect) and Wales (where the Act was not introduced)
before and after the Act. The reason for choosing these two regions is due to their
geographical proximity, comparability in immigration procedures and similarity in
key demographics. We estimate a difference-in-difference model for two separate
sample groups, households with children and for households without children. If
the number of schools actually does affect the location choice, it should be re-
flected in the magnitude of the number of immigrants with children relative to the
number of immigrants with no children, ceteris paribus. Also, we do the same
analysis by dividing the immigrants into occupation categories. The regression
model accounts for any variation in the immigration levels in the two regions due
to differences in crime, religion, house prices, industry sector and economic ac-
tivity.
In the second part of the paper, we study the relationship between the num-
ber of schools and immigrants’ location choice within the London boroughs. We
employ a discrete choice model where a migrant’s utility depends on number of
schools in a borough, borough demographics such as crime rate, unemployment
rate, number of active enterprises and religious distribution. Unobserved vari-
ables such as social ties in a borough can also be one of the drivers for the
opening up of new free schools after the Academies Act was passed. To mitigate
this endogeneity bias, we use instrumental variables such as the timing of the
Academies Act and lagged number of schools. The intuition for the instrumental
variables is that the timing of the Academies Act will be correlated to the change
in number of schools but is not correlated to the social ties in a borough.
We conducted both the analyses for two main reasons. First, London is
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unique in terms of its immigration patterns from rest of the UK.2 It can be due
to London being an economic hub as well as due to social ties among immi-
grants. Hence, studying immigration patterns in both areas adds robustness to
our findings. Second, the two approaches employ distinct econometric methods,
difference-in-difference for the first approach while a discrete choice logit model
for the second one. Each econometric approach relies on specific identifying re-
striction. While the difference-in-difference method relies primarily on a parallel
trends assumptions, the discrete choice model for location choice assumes IIA
(independence of irrelevant alternatives) among London boroughs and the exclu-
sion restriction of the instrumental variable. Although we test for these identifying
assumptions where possible, a similar finding across both methods can further
support our results.
The theory that people are attracted towards the place where they are pro-
vided with more public goods can be traced to Tiebout (1956). The paper shows
that if there are a number of alternative communities in which a consumer can
locate in and these communities differ in their provision of public goods, then
each consumer will choose that place which offers the public goods closest to
his ideals. This will subsequently lead to an optimal size of a community where
optimal size is defined as the number of residents for whom the decided set of
public goods can be produced at the lowest cost. Banzhaf and Walsh (2008) and
Cebula (2009) provide further validation of the Tiebout hypothesis. Banzhaf and
Walsh (2008), using data on California, find that population density increased in
those areas which witnesses an exogenous increase in public goods while the
Cebula (2009) using state level data from the US between 2000-2005 finds that
consumers prefer states with lower income tax burdens and those states which
have spent more on primary and secondary education. Borjas (1999), using the
1980-90 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the US Census, demonstrates
how locational choices of welfare benefit receiving immigrants to the US are in-
fluenced by interstate dispersion of welfare benefits. He found that in the case
2In 2015, London had 37% of the foreign born population in the U.K., followed by the South
East region which had only 13%.
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of self selected migrants, if the marginal cost of choosing to live in one US state
over another one is small, once the decision to emigrate from their country has
been made, then such immigrants tend to move to those states which give them
the highest benefits.
Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) estimate how locational decisions of migrants in
the EU15 countries are affected by the welfare generosity of these countries. 3
They find a small but significant impact of welfare policies on the location choices
of migrants. Verdugo (2015) shows how a 1970s reform in France that allowed
immigrants with children to have access to public housing influenced the initial
location choices of migrants. Using a difference-in-difference approach to com-
pare changes in the choice of location for immigrants with and without children
after the introduction of the reform, the paper finds that cities that had more public
housing supplies had a larger influx of immigrants with children. There is also a
considerable literature that highlights the fact that migrants tend to concentrate in
those locations which have relevant ethnic clustering (Bartel 1989, Pohl 2007).
Using the difference-in-difference method, we find that after the implementa-
tion of the Act, there has been a significant increase in the number of immigrants
with children to the North West England as compared to the Wales, however there
is no significant difference in the number of immigrants without children between
the control and treatment group. Also, when we estimate the model by dividing
the immigrants into occupation categories, our findings are similar. In the discrete
choice model, the estimated parameters show that there has been a significant
increase in the immigration in London boroughs due to an increase in the number
of schools. We find that a 1% increase in the number of schools in a borough
increased the number of immigrants by 1.4% on an average.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a description
of the kinds of schools in England and Wales and discusses the Academies Act.
Section 3.3 describes the difference-in-difference model. Section 3.4 discusses
the discrete choice model of immigrant location decisions within London boroughs
3The EU15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
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while Section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Schools in England and Wales
There are broadly four different types of schools in England - (1) Maintained
schools, (2) Academies, (3) Independent schools and (4) Grammar schools. Fur-
ther, Maintained Schools can be of four kinds. First, community Schools are run
and controlled by the local authority who also employs the staff, decides on ad-
mission requirements and owns the land and buildings. Second, foundation and
trust schools are run by the governing body who also decides on the admission
criteria and employs the staff. The land is owned by the governing body or by a
charity in case of trust schools. Third, voluntary Aided Schools are mostly faith
schools where a religious foundation or trust provides a small portion of the cap-
ital costs for the school and they also form a majority on the school’s governing
body. This religious body owns the land and buildings while the governing body
employs staff and sets admission criteria. Lastly, Voluntary Controlled Schools
are like the Voluntary Aided Schools but are run by the local authority who are
entrusted with the responsibility of employing staff and deciding admission re-
quirements. The foundation or the trust owns the land and buildings and normally
forms a quarter of the governing body.
Academies can be of three types. First, traditional Academies are normally
under performing schools which are allocated to an academic sponsor to take
over. Such academic sponsors could be universities, FE colleges, education
charities or business sponsors. These academies are independent, free of lo-
cal authority control and are accountable to the Government through a funding
agreement. The funding agreement enlists the duties of the Academy Trust, the
rules of running the school and recruitment of teachers, details of funding for
the school and all other aspects involved in the maintenance and upkeep of the
school. They are usually set up with the Department of Education brokering be-
tween the academy providers and under performing schools. Second, converter
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Academies are already existing high performing schools who opt for academy sta-
tus to gain independence and move out of the jurisdiction of the local authority.
Like the Traditional ones, they also have a funding agreement with the govern-
ment. Finally, Free Schools are new state schools including independent schools
becoming state schools for the first time. They operate in law like academies.
These schools can be set up by teachers, parents, existing schools, educational
charities, universities or community groups after they have submitted an appli-
cation demonstrating the requirement of that form of school by parents in that
particular area. In order to set up the schools, the group applying to set it up
has to form a guaranteed limited company, appointing members and directors
who can run it. These schools are independent, free from the control of the lo-
cal authority and like other academies, accountable to the government through a
funding agreement.
The Academies, with increased autonomy in running schools, recruiting teach-
ers and pupil admissions, were expected to perform better than maintained schools.
The National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) found that pupils in
secondary sponsored academies were 2.7% more likely to achieve better GCSE
grades (5 or more A to C grades) as compared to their contemporaries in the
local authority maintained schools.
Apart from the maintained schools and academies, there also exist grammar
schools and independent schools. Grammar schools are state funded schools
that select their students on the basis of their academic ability. Independent
schools are those that are set up and governed by the school itself i.e. by an
independent body of governors. They charge a fee to attend and can also make
profits. They could be set up by companies and charities. In Wales, the types of
schools are same as those in England except that there are no academies or free
schools.
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3.2.1 Academies Act
Academies were first introduced by the Labor government in 2002-03 whereby
only secondary schools were eligible to become academies once they were able
to find a sponsor. Later, the Academies Act of 2010 made it possible for all pub-
licly funded schools in England to become academies, still publicly funded but
with an increased degree of autonomy in issues such as setting teachers’ wages
and diverging from the national curriculum. With the introduction of this Act, even
primary schools were allowed to become academies. Requirement of a spon-
sor was no longer necessary and most importantly, it led to the creation of free
schools. Prior to 2010, the main aim of the Labor government in introducing
the Academies was to improve schools that were under-performing. However,
the Academies Act introduced in the 55th UK Parliament by the Conservative–
Liberal Democrat coalition government called for greater autonomy and injected
more competition into the state school sector. Thus, post 2010, though traditional
sponsored academies continued to open, there were more converter academies
which started to come into existence. Eyles et al (2015) conduct a study to high-
light the differences between the academies before and after the implementation
of the policy and the possible implications on the quality of pupil enrolment.
Before 2010, there were 203 Academies in England. By January 2011, a
total of 407 primary and secondary schools with academy status existed, with
the 371 secondary academies representing 11% of the total number of sec-
ondary schools. By the end of August 2016, there were 5,825 academies. The
Academies Act also authorized the creation of free schools. A free school, as
described in the preceding section, is a type of academy, a non-profit making, in-
dependent, State-funded school which is free to attend but is not controlled by any
local authority. In September 2011, the first 24 free schools opened and the num-
ber rapidly increased to 425 in September 2016. These schools normally opened
at the beginning of the academic year. The number of free schools which started
in the academic year 2012-13 was almost double than the first wave in 2011-12.
A Briefing (No. 7033, 2nd December 2016) from the House of Commons Library
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states that London had the largest number of free schools at 130 and North East
England with the fewest at 12 till December 2016. It is more likely that the free
schools were located in deprived areas and it was found that non-white popula-
tion in primary free schools was 55% which was well above the national rate of
25%. Table 3.1 shows the number of free schools which have opened in various
parts of England between 2011 and 2016 after the introduction of the Act. Table
3.2 lists the number and type of academies in North West England and London
which have opened up from the year 2005 onwards. Converter Academies came
into being from 2010 only.
Table 3.1: Number of Free Schools and Average Population in Various regions of
England.
Year London North
West
West Mid-
lands
South
West
2011 9 2 2 1
2012 18 6 7 2
2013 33 14 10 11
2014 33 11 7 7
2015 20 7 13 8
2016 20 9 4 5
Avg Population 8,424,706 7,038,817 5,629,217 5,306,961
Source: Data for Free Schools is obtained from Department of Education, U.K.
Government. Population Data is from the Annual Population Survey
3.3 Impact of the Academies Act on Immigration: A
difference-in-difference analysis
In this section, we will use a difference-in-difference regression model to anal-
yse the impact of the Academies Act (2010) on the location choices of immi-
grants. First, we will discuss the various data sources, the methods employed to
clean the data and some key descriptive statistics. Subsequently, we discuss the
difference-in-difference model and estimation results.
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Table 3.2: Type and Number of Academies in North West England and Wales
North West London
Year Sponsor Converter Total Sponsor Converter Total
2005 1 0 1 4 0 4
2006 1 0 2 9 0 13
2007 4 0 6 10 0 23
2008 7 0 13 8 0 31
2009 9 0 22 8 0 39
2010 9 7 38 6 14 59
2011 4 80 122 5 128 192
2012 14 57 193 13 72 277
2013 18 48 259 34 51 362
2014 26 36 321 37 37 436
2015 30 43 394 21 36 493
2016 16 51 461 24 63 580
Source: Department of Education, U.K. Government
3.3.1 Data
Immigration data
We use data on the stock of immigrants to U.K. from the Annual Population Survey
(APS) between 2006-2016. The APS uses data from the Labor Force Survey
(LFS) and is a household level survey covering the U.K. with an approximate
sample size of 320,000 respondents. It was first published in 2004 and is available
for every calendar quarter. The LFS interviews are conducted in five waves, one
wave pertaining to one quarter. This means that each cohort is interviewed five
times after which it drops out from the sample. The APS combines waves one
and five from four successive quarters of the LFS. This ensures that the APS
does not have the same responding households. In addition to this, the APS is
augmented with three annual boost samples. In these boosts, the respondents
are also interviewed for four waves but at yearly intervals, with one quarter of the
sample being replaced each year. These sample boosts are called English Local
labor Force Survey, Welsh Local labor Force Survey and Scottish Local labor
Force Survey.
In our analysis, we use a dataset spanning 10 years. To prevent a respondent
from being counted more than once, we only use the first wave of the main LFS
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as well as the boost surveys. We define immigrants as those people whose coun-
try of birth is not England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. The difference
between nationality and country of birth is that nationality may change over time
but country of birth does not and hence gives more accurate estimates of any
changes over time. This definition of an immigrant in line with most of the prior lit-
erature in this area. For our econometric analysis, we restrict our sample to adult
male married and unmarried immigrants with children. We do this to prevent dou-
ble counting a family in the sample. Consequently, we have a dataset comprising
adult male immigrants with children for every year between 2006-2016.
Demographic Data
We obtain data for crime for the different regions of England and Wales from the
database used for the National Statistics bulletin Crime in England and Wales,
published by the Office of National Statistics (ONS).In our case, crime is mea-
sured by the number of offenses committed. House prices are simple average
house prices obtained from ONS and are calculated in pounds. Unemployment
rates and Economic activity rates are also obtained from the ONS. Economic
Activity rate is the percentage of total economically active individuals in the pop-
ulation over 16 years of age in the region. Unemployment rate is measured as a
percentage of the total number of economically active individuals in the region. It
is the total number of unemployed people divided by the total number of econom-
ically active people in the region. Age is in number of years while the proportion
of people belonging to a religion is the number of people in the religion divided by
the total population of the region. Table 3.3 depicts the summary statistics of the
above mentioned demographic variables.
3.3.2 Data Analysis
Table 3.4 depicts the similarities between the North West of England and Wales
in terms of the regions’ demographic factors between 2006 and 2016. We find
that unemployment rate is approximately 7% in both the regions and they also
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics for U.K. from Annual Population Survey for 2006-
2016
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 40.72 13.64 16 79
Unemployment rate (%) 6.57 1.72 3.6 10.8
Crime (No. of offences) 443,651 190,291 139,920 992,557
Eco Activity Rate (%) 63.49 2.09 58.9 68.8
Mean Net Pay (£) 3154.18 1887.52 286.37 9043.95
Average House Price (£) 240,533 83,596 141,126 534,272
Mean Net Pay (£) 3,093.38 1,883.49 286.37 8,978.79
Prop. of Christians 0.56 0.22 - -
Prop. of Muslims 0.04 0.04 - -
Prop. of Hindu 0.01 0.01 - -
Notes: The above table is compiled from the Annual Population Survey. It consists of data
from all regions of England (North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humber, East Midlands,
West Midlands, Eastern, London, South East and South West) as well as Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland from 2006-2016.. In the table, mean net pay is calculated monthly.
exhibit very similar house prices. This implies that an immigrant when choosing
whether to locate in the North West of England or Wales should be indifferent
when considering these factors. In addition, the distributions of the major religions
were also very similar. Thus, an immigrant’s choice of locating in one region over
the other due to ethnic clustering or social ties can be assumed to be similar.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of immigrants (defined as those who were not
born in the U.K.) over the period 2005-2015. We can see that before 2010, the
immigration pattern was similar in the North West and Wales. However, post 2010
there has been an influx of people into the North West of England while such a
trend cannot be seen in Wales.
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Figure 3.1: Immigrants to North West England and Wales, 2006-2016
Source: Annual Population Survey
Table 3.4: North West England and Wales 2006-2010
North
West
Wales
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.8 6.7
Eco Activity Rate (%) 61.8 59.6
House Prices (£) 172,068 166,916
Prop. of Christians 0.776 0.709
Prop. of Muslims 0.048 0.007
Prop. of Hindus 0.005 0.002
Source: Annual Population Survey, 2006-2010
Table 3.5 shows the average total population and immigrant population in the
two regions in the years before and after the introduction of the Act. This table
shows that not only has total population increased in both the regions, immigrant
population has also increased. However, the immigrant to population ratio has
risen more in the North West (0.014) than in Wales (0.008). This may be con-
sidered as a preliminary evidence of the impact of the Academies Act on the
immigration levels.
Table 3.6 depicts the changes in the population of male immigrants in the
two regions after the implementation of the Act. Since the Act was introduced
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Table 3.5: Average Population and Immigration in North West England and Wales
North West Wales
2006-2010 2011-2016 2006-2010 2011-2016
Population 6,876,500 7,038,817 2,987,517 3,051,958
Immigrant Population 494,976 608,169 143,086 171,394
Immigrants to Total Population 0.072 0.086 0.048 0.056
Source: Annual Population Survey, 2006-2016.
in 2010, we allow for the fact that immigrants may take some time to make a
decision on where to locate i.e. it takes time for them to decide on where to stay,
what kind of property to stay in (rented or bought) and often it may take time
for the employment contract to be finalized. Given these factors, we calculate the
percentage change in immigrant male population in the two regions between 2010
and 2015. We find that both the regions witnessed an increase in the population of
immigrant males with children as well as without children. In the North West, since
the introduction of the Act, married and unmarried males with children increased
by 99% from 2010 to 2015 while those without children increased by only 38%.
On the other hand, though Wales also witnessed an increase in both immigrant
males with and without children, the increase is higher for males without children
as compared to male immigrants with children.
Table 3.6: No. of male immigrants with/without children and change in popu-
lation of male immigrants between 2010 (pre Academies Act) and 2015 (post
Academies Act)
Males with children Males without children
Region 2010 2015 % chng 2010-15 2010 2015 % chng 2010-15
North West 59,205 118,121 99% 113,270 156,184 38%
Wales 18,818 24,695 31% 30,812 44,306 44%
Source: Annual Population Survey
Table 3.7 enlists the average employment of immigrant males before and after
2010 in North West and Wales in our sample. The North West saw a greater
increase in immigrant employment in the professional as well as elementary oc-
cupation sectors as compared to Wales. This could be due to the fact that North
West has more industries as opposed to Wales. At the same time, knowing Welsh
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provides extra advantage to people choosing to locate in Wales, whereas immi-
grants are mostly not adept in that language. It is important to study immigration
patterns by different occupation categories as particular vocations may have pref-
erences in choosing North West England or Wales due to unobserved demand
or supply side shocks.
Table 3.7: Average Employment of Males by Occupation in North West England
and Wales, before 2010 (pre Academies Act) and after 2010 (post Academies
Act)
North West Wales
Before 2010 After 2010 Before 2010 After 2010
Manager and Senior Officials 17,598 20,680 4,774 4,724
Professional Occupations 20,472 38,169 5,525 10,369
Associate Professional and Technical 12,470 15,395 3,433 4,636
Administrative and Secretarial 5,537 8,198 1,289 1,860
Skilled Trade Occupations 18,693 30,958 4,532 7,286
Personal Service Occupations 4,966 9,584 1,257 2,285
Sales and Customer Service 8,916 13,626 1,360 2,608
Process Plant and Machine Operations 23,701 36,269 4,322 6,772
Elementary Occupations 25,324 40,034 5,796 7,803
Source: Annual Population Survey
3.3.3 Difference-in-difference model
We use a standard difference-in-difference model to analyse differences in immi-
gration stocks between the treatment (North West) and control (Wales) groups,
before and after the policy change i.e. introduction of the Academies Act in 2010.
Figure 3.2 shows the geographical proximity of North West England and Wales.
Figure 3.1 shows the number of immigrants (defined as those who were not born
in the UK) over the period 2005-2015. We can see that before 2010, the immi-
gration pattern was similar in the North West and Wales. However, post 2010
there has been an influx of people into the North West of England while such a
trend cannot be seen in Wales. Also, both England and Wales have very similar
immigration procedures.4
4All applications for the visit and stay in both England and Wales are handled by a common
organization, U.K. Visas and Immigration division.
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Figure 3.2: Map of UK
We study the effect of the Act on the locational choice of married and unmar-
ried immigrant males with children. This is because people with children are more
likely to respond to or let their decision to locate in a certain region be influenced
by changes in policies pertaining to education. We compare the estimation re-
sults from the aforementioned group to married and unmarried males who do not
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have children and, ideally, they should react similarly to all other factors as the
previous group except to changes in education policy. We estimate the following
regression model,
Immigst =  + 1Aftert + 2Treats + Aftert  Treats + 3Xst + t + st (3.1)
where Immigst is the dependant variable which is the flow of immigration to region
s in year t. Aftert is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from year 2011
onwards. Treats is a dummy for North West England which is the treatment group
while Wales is the control. Aftert Treats is our variable of interest and the coeffi-
cient  captures the effect of the Academies Act on the immigration levels. Xst is
a set of control variables which includes the industry sectors in which immigrants
work in period t in region s, religion, mean pay from job, average house prices,
unemployment rate and the rate of economic activity. Ideally, immigrants would
want to locate in places which have lower crime rates and where they have greater
chances of employment, as measured by the economic activity rate, but may be
constrained by their economic resources. Religion also plays an important role
in location decisions due to network effects with existing immigrants and the role
of ethnic clustering. Finally, t captures the year fixed effects which controls for
common macro-economic shocks for accounting the year-to-year variation.
3.3.4 Results
Table 3.8, reports results from estimating regression equation (1) without dividing
immigrants according to their occupation groups.5 Thus, every observation is
at the region–year level. Column (1) shows the difference-in-difference results
without any control variables, while in both columns (2) and (3) we include the
controls. In column (3), we also include year fixed effects. The difference in the
magnitudes of final effect between the three specifications shows that controlling
for year fixed effects and other control variables is important. Based on the most
5Table with the coefficients on the full set of controls is shown in Appendix C.1.
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general specification (3), we can infer that as a result of the Act, approximately
14,800 more immigrant males with children chose to locate in the North West
of England. This represents about 2% of the total male immigrants to the North
West after 2010 in the sample.
Table 3.8: Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants with Children
(1) (2) (3)
Variable
Aftert  Treats 11,005.600*** 9,703.907*** 14,752.456***
(3,006.260) (2,770.921) (2,573.225)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.965 0.983 0.997
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We then categorise immigrants according to their occupation categories. Ev-
ery observation now is at the occupation group–region–year level. Table 3.9 re-
ports the estimation results.6 Column (1) shows the simple difference-in-difference
analysis when we do not control for any characteristics of the regions under con-
sideration (no control variables). Post 2010, approximately 1,130 more male im-
migrants with children moved to the North West due to the Act and the effect
is statistically significant at the 1% level. They constituted about 0.16% of total
male immigrants to the North West after 2010 in the sample. Column (2) reports
the estimates after we control for average house price, unemployment rate, eco-
nomic activity rate, mean net pay of adult male immigrants and religion in the
region. Use of time varying controls like mean net pay can lead to potential endo-
geneity concerns that may arise due to reverse causality. However, it is plausible
to think that an increase in the number of immigrants in a particular region may
lead to a downward movement in wages in a region but this would only affect
subsequent (and not current) immigration into the region. In Column (3), we also
control for the year fixed effects, in addition to the aforementioned controls and
6Table with the complete coefficients on controls in shown in Appendix C.2.
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find similar results. These estimates show us that the post 2010, immigration to
the North West increased by about 1,300 and this formed 0.20% of the total male
immigrants to the North West after 2010.
Table 3.9: Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants with Children, by Occu-
pation Group
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 1,132.549*** 980.242*** 1,354.149***
(320.870) (354.727) (480.608)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 195 195 195
R-squared 0.751 0.763 0.770
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Subsequently, we compare our results to the sample of male immigrants with-
out any children. Table 3.10 reports results from estimating equation (1) for male
immigrants without children, but without dividing the immigrants by their occu-
pation categories. Table 3.11 reports the results of the same analysis on adult
immigrant males without children, but categorized according to their occupational
groups.7 Both tables confirm that post 2010 i.e. after the implementation of the
Act, there has not been any significant increase in immigration of adult males
without children to the North West relative to the Wales. Hence, we can infer that
the introduction of the Academies Act significantly impacted the location choice of
immigrants with children only. This result suggests that one of the factors which
immigrants take into account while deciding where to migrate depends on the
education facilities in that particular region, specifically the number of schools.
Overall, we can conclude that immigrants take the provision of public goods into
account while choosing where to locate.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a specification of equation (1) where
the dependent variable is the share of the various groups of male immigrants to
7The coefficients on the full set of controls is shown in Appendices C.3 and C.4.
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Table 3.10: Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants without Children
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Inters 6,914.033 7,189.675 7,799.312
(4,437.606) (4,668.104) (7,439.728)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.967 0.979 0.991
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11: Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants without Children, by
Occupation Group
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 568.948 591.592 929.751
(376.751) (422.855) (574.063)
Controls No Yes Yes
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.727 0.735 0.740
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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the total population in the regions. Although, the statistical significance reduces
while using the shares, the main finding still holds. Detailed tables with coeffi-
cients on full controls can be found in Appendix C.5. To verify similarity in im-
migration trends between North West and Wales prior to the Academies Act, we
conduct a test for parallel trends assumption in equation (1) by including interac-
tions of time dummies with the treatment indicator for three years (i.e. 2007, 2008
and 2009) before the introduction of the Act (C.6). We find that the coefficients on
these interaction terms are insignificant, suggesting that there was no significant
difference in the immigration trend between North West and Wales prior to the
Academies Act.
3.4 An Empirical Model of Discrete Choice
In this section, we focus on the impact of public good provision on the location
choice of immigrants within the London boroughs using a discrete choice model.
The case of London is particularly important because it has the highest number
of immigrants among all regions in the United Kingdom (3.2 million foreign born
people in 2015 compared to approximately 5.5 million foreign born in the whole
of U.K.). According to the Commons Briefing Paper on Migration Statistics (Jan-
uary 2018), approximately 38% of people living in London were born outside the
U.K. compared with 14% in the UK as a whole. In Figure 3.3, we can see that
immigration to London has always been considerably higher than any other parts
of England while Figure 3.4 shows that the immigration to population ratio in Lon-
don is considerably higher than the rest of England. These migrants once they
have decided to move to London, try to make a choice regarding settling in one
of the boroughs by taking into account multiple factors like demographics of the
boroughs and provision of public goods. Our primary focus is to investigate the
role of number of schools in the location choice of an immigrant.
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Figure 3.3: Immigration in London vs Other Parts of England
Figure 3.4: Immigrants as a Percentage of Total Resident Population
3.4.1 Data
Immigration Data
We utilize data for the flow of immigrants from Flag 4 records provided to the
Office of National Statistics from the Patient Register Data Service (PRDS) by
NHS Connecting for Health (NHSCfH) between the periods 2005-2015. A Flag 4
is generated when an individual registers with a General Practitioner (GP) if the
individual was born outside the U.K. and enters England and Wales for the first
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time and registers with a NHS GP. An individual’s registration will also generate a
Flag 4 if the previous address of an individual is reported as outside the United
Kingdom, and time spent outside the U.K. is more than three months. When an in-
ternational migrant subsequently moves internally within the UK, and re-registers
with a second GP, the ‘Flag 4’ demarcation is not retained as the individual’s last
residence is now within the U.K. As compared to the APS data used in the previ-
ous section where the sample set of immigrants are foreign born residents chosen
from a random sample of residents, GP data differs in the sense as it comprises
only of the newly arrived immigrants.
We obtain data for total population and number of dependent children from the
Office of National Statistics. We find that Brent, Ealing, Newham and Tower Ham-
lets have the highest immigrant population among other boroughs. The reliability
of the GP data can be verified from the fact that the numbers are approximately
the same as obtained from Long Term International Migration data published by
the ONS.
Data on Schools
We obtain data for schools from the Edubase database for 2005–2015. This
dataset contains information on all types of schools in the London boroughs, in-
cluding their date of establishment, and closure date (if applicable) as well the
date of conversion into an Academy. In order to get a unique set of schools,
we first identify those set of local authority maintained infant and junior schools
which amalgamated to form a primary school. We also enlist those schools which
converted into Academies. This strategy prevents us from double counting the
number of schools.8
Table 3.12 shows how the number of various types of schools have changed
over the years in London. There has been an increase in the total number of
8As an example, if in 2010 in a particular borough, if there were 3 Local Authority (LA) main-
tained and 2 Academies (5 schools in total), and if in 2011, one primary LA maintained converted
into an academy, then the number of schools in the borough in 2011 would not change. The
only change would in the composition of the schools i.e. in 2011 there would be 2 LA maintained
schools and 3 Academies.
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schools after 2010. Most of this increase can be attributed to the opening of new
free schools as the decrease in the LA maintained schools is offset by an almost
equal increase in the number of Academies. Also, there has been a marginal
increase in the number of independent schools.
Table 3.12: Number of Different types of Schools in London, 2005-2015
Year Maintained Academies Free
Schools
Independent Total
2005 2,373 16 0 480 2,869
2006 2,367 25 0 472 2,864
2007 2,359 36 0 474 2,869
2008 2,346 44 0 472 2,862
2009 2,325 53 0 475 2,853
2010 2,299 74 0 479 2,852
2011 2,174 215 9 497 2,895
2012 2,074 307 28 505 2,914
2013 1,979 395 60 512 2,946
2014 1,907 471 93 509 2,980
2015 1,860 530 111 507 3,008
Source: Edubase, Department of Education, Govt. of UK
Demographic Data
Data on crime for the London boroughs is obtained from the London Metropolitan
Police database. Crime is measured as the total number of offences in a financial
year and includes violence against a person, sexual offences, robbery, burglary,
theft and handling, fraud and forgery, criminal damage, drugs and other notifiable
damages. House prices are obtained from the Department of Communities and
Local Government (DCLG) and is measured in pounds. Unemployment rates are
model based estimates obtained from the ONS. Active enterprises are defined as
those enterprises which had either turnover or employment at any time during the
reference period, and are obtained from ONS. Table 3.13 describes the summary
statistics in the dataset. Newham is one of the most deprived boroughs with a
high unemployment rate, small number of active enterprises and is also on the
higher end in regards to the number offences recorded. This is also a borough
which has a high immigrant population.
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Table 3.13: Summary Statistics of the Sample
Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Net immigration 6,600 3,407 953 25,429
Population 251,945 54,387 152,489 37,9691
Population (3-18yrs) 47,806 13,281 22,368 80,935
Crime (No. of offences) 25,459 9,883 9288 71,582
Unemployment rate (%) 8 12.2 3.5 14.2
House prices (pounds) 323,801 144,795 16,000 120,000
Active enterprises 12,787 7758 3,190 55,385
3.4.2 Model
We develop and estimate a discrete choice model to study the effect of the num-
ber of schools in a London borough on the immigrant location decision. Immi-
grants may either choose to locate in any one of the 32 London boroughs or out-
side London (rest of the U.K.). Utility of an immigrant i from locating in a borough
j at time t can be represented by,
Uijt = Sjt + Xjt + jt + ijt , (3.2)
where Sjt is the number of schools in a borough j at time t. Xjt is a set of
borough characteristics in year t. It includes a range of factors such as crime
rate, unemployment rate, house prices, number of active enterprises, and re-
ligious distribution in a borough. It is important to include these factors since
socio-economic factors could have an important bearing on the location choice
of a migrant. Crime (measured as number of offences in a year), unemployment
rate and house prices reflect how safe a borough is and the level of economic
affluence. House prices also act as a proxy for rent in an area which helps a
migrant to identify the kind of property he wants to live in. Religious distribution
controls for ethnic clustering as migrants often tend to locate in boroughs where
they would expect greater opportunities for social networking. In practice, we use
the control variables in Xjt lagged by one year because immigrant decisions are
often taken well in advance to the final movement. jt captures unobserved char-
acteristics of a borough j in a given year t such as social ties among residents or
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culture in a borough. ijt is an individual specific error term which is assumed to
have a Type 1 extreme value distribution.
An individual will choose location j if it gives her the highest utility among all
the destinations. Probability that an immigrant i chooses location j is given by,
Pijt = P(Uijt > Uikt 8k 6= j)
= P(Sjt + Xjt + jt + ijt > Skt + Xkt + kt + ikt 8k 6= j)
= P(ikt   ijt < Sjt   Skt + Xjt   Xkt + jt   kt 8k 6= j).
(3.3)
The outside option, denoted by 0, for an immigrant is the decision to locate in
any other part of the U.K. outside of London. Since only the difference in utilities
between the destinations are identified, the outside option utility is normalized to
0.
Since all ijt disturbances are assumed to be Type 1 extreme value distributed,
the probability that immigrants will choose borough j is given by,
Pjt =
eSjt+Xjt+jt
1 + 32k=1eSkt+Xkt+kt
. (3.4)
The above equation can also be interpreted to represent the share of immi-
grants for borough j in time t as a fraction of the total number of immigrants in the
U.K. The model exhibits the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property
since we have the logit error assumption. This implies that the unobserved portion
of utility of one alternative is uncorrelated to the unobserved portion of utility of
another alternative. Hence, after controlling for all the observed borough charac-
teristics if an immigrant moves out of a particular borough, then she is indifferent
between locating in any of the other boroughs. This may not be an unrealis-
tic assumption because London has a very unified and extensive transportation
system.
Subtracting log of equation (4) from log of the probability of choosing the out-
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side option gives us,
lnPjt   lnP0t = ln

eSjt+Xjt+jt
1 +
P32
k=1 eSkt+Xkt+kt

  ln

eS0t+X0t+0t
1 +
P32
k=1 eSkt+Xkt+kt

= Sjt + Xjt + jt   S0t   X0t   0t.
(3.5)
Since the outside option utility is normalized to 0, the equation becomes,
lnPjt   lnP0t = Sjt + Xjt + jt . (3.6)
The above equation is used to compute jt which is used in the estimation
procedure using GMM,
E [Zjtjt ] = 0, (3.7)
where Zjt are variables exogenous to jt. One of the concerns is that the num-
ber of schools, Sjt, may be correlated to the unobserved structural error, jt, which
measures the strength of social ties or culture in a borough. The social ties
among communities in a borough are not only a driver of the location choice
of an immigrant due to network effects but also directly impact the opening up
of new free schools after the Academies Act was passed. To address this en-
dogeneity issue, we use the instrumental variable (IV) approach which relies on
the exogenous variation provided by the Academies Act of 2010 brought in by
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government. We instrument the total
number of schools by two IVs: a dummy variable which holds value 1 after 2010;
0 otherwise; and a lagged number of schools by two years in a borough. The
binary instrument created using the Academies Act can be a valid instrument be-
cause the timing of the Act may not be correlated to the social ties in a borough.
Also, the Academies Act implemented in the whole of England was not introduced
to tackle an increased demand for education due to increased immigration. The
lagged number of schools by two years is a good instrument as well because it
is less likely that the choice of immigrants at time t will be affected the number of
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schools in the past. The decision to migrate to UK and to a specific borough can
take some months due to the various processes involved such as visa applica-
tions and formal job contracts. However, it is unlikely that any of these procedures
extend over an year. Hence, number of schools lagged by 2 years or more is likely
to be uncorrelated to an immigrants location choice which is a requirement for it
to be a valid instrument. Increasing the lag by more than two years, will also
satisfy the exclusion restriction but the correlation with the number of schools in
the current period also decreases. So, we use the number of schools lagged by
2 years as an instrument.9
3.4.3 Results
Table 3.14 reports the results from estimating equation (3.7). Columns (1) and (2)
shows the estimation results without using any IV and using both IVs respectively.
We find that an increase in the number of schools in the boroughs does not have
any statistically significant impact on the immigration to a borough. Column 3 and
4 represent estimation results where we control for borough level fixed effects as
well.
We find that once borough level fixed effects are included and using IV, an
increase in the number of schools has a positive effect on immigration and is sta-
tistically significant as well. Comparing specifications (1) and (3) shows us that
just accounting for borough fixed effects is not sufficient to provide a significant
result. Similarly, comparing specifications (1) and (2) shows that without control-
ling for borough level fixed effects, if we only use an IV approach, schools have
no statistically significant effect on immigration as well. However, once we use
the IV, in addition to controlling for borough fixed effects (column 4), an increase
in the number of schools in a borough actually has a positive and significant ef-
fect. Thus, although columns (2) and (4) are both correcting for endogeneity, the
significant impact of schools on immigration in only column (4) enables us to con-
9Increased immigration to a borough may increase demand for education and thereby lead to
an increase in the number of schools in the borough. Thus there arises a problem of reverse
causality which can be addressed using the instrumental variable approach.
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Table 3.14: Effect of Academies Act on Immigration to London borough
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Without IV IV Borough FE Borough FE + IV elasticity
Schools 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.016** 1.441
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008)
Crime 4.020*** 4.033*** 1.325** 1.325** 0.336
(0.813) (0.819) (0.603) (0.606)
House price 0.152** 0.151** 0.042 0.037 0.114
(0.070) (0.069) (0.032) (0.028)
Active enterprise -3.606*** -3.614*** 3.246** 2.479** 0.305
(1.294) (1.297) (1.409) (1.216)
Unemployment 0.036 0.036 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.367
(0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009)
Christian -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.343
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Jew 0.006 0.006 0.022 0.024* 0.044
(0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.013)
Buddhist -0.008 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.050) (0.050) (0.015) (0.016)
Hindu-Sikh 0.023** 0.023** 0.003 0.003 0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 288 288 288 288
R-squared 0.642 0.642 0.139
Borough FE No No Yes Yes
Number of Boroughs 32 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
clude that borough fixed effects are also important. Also, the OLS model (3) in
3.14 biases the coefficients on the number of schools downward as compared to
the IV model (4). This suggests that the potential omitted variable, strength of
social ties, is likely to be positively correlated to the probability of an immigrant
choice but negatively correlated to the number of schools in a borough. However,
since this effect is weaker than the borough fixed effects it did not show up in
specification (2).
The coefficients on the control variables only tell us the correlation between
the variables and immigration, without throwing any light on causality. We find
that there is a positive correlation between the immigrant share in a borough and
unemployment and crime rate in a borough. This may imply that immigrants tend
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to locate in deprived neighbourhoods.10 The location choice of immigrants are
also positively correlated to the number of active enterprises in the borough. This
seems reasonable as immigrants may choose to locate in boroughs with a higher
scope of employment. The corresponding elasticities tell us by how much the
probability of locating in a borough changes if the variables under consideration
change. We find that if the number of schools increase by 1%, then the probabil-
ity of choosing a borough increases by 1.4%. It is particularly interesting that the
elasticity for number of schools is in the elastic range, which suggests that immi-
grants are very responsive to the provision of public goods (number of schools)
in London. All the columns report standard errors which are clustered at the
borough level.
3.5 Conclusion
The main objective in this paper has been to investigate the impact of the pro-
vision of public goods on immigration. We study public goods in the form of
education, specifically the number of schools, and explore this issue using two
separate analyses. Both approaches rely on an exogenous variation to the num-
ber of schools provided by the Academies Act (2010). First, using a difference-in-
difference method we compare immigration patterns in North West England and
Wales. We estimate the difference-in-difference specification for two samples,
with and without children. We conclude that the North West witnessed a signif-
icantly greater influx of immigrants with children as compared to Wales, where
the Act was not introduced. There was no significant difference between the two
regions for immigrants without children. Subsequently, using a discrete choice
analysis, we develop and estimate a discrete choice model for immigrant location
choice using data from London boroughs. We mitigate the endogeneity bias us-
ing an instrumental variable approach, and find that a 1% increase in the number
of schools leads to 1.4% increase in the share of immigrants to a borough.
10This could also imply that a larger number of immigrants in a particular borough lead to higher
unemployment rates and crime in such boroughs, making a case for reverse causality.
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Both the analyses using different econometric methodologies conclude that
immigrant households in the UK allow their location decision to be guided by the
availability of educational facilities. This investigation also leaves scope for further
research where one could analyse the impact of other public goods such as social
housing and medical facilities on immigration.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of the structural form of total em-
ployment for the ith country : Stage 3
In the second stage wages are equalized between countries all the countries.
Therefore if wages are equalized between country i and j, j 6= i,
1
2
j
Kjq
1 + lIj + l˜j
=
1
2
i
Kiq
1 + lIi + l˜i
1 + lIj + l˜j
1 + lIi + l˜i
=
2j
2i
qji qji =
 Kj
Ki
2 (A.1)
If there are N countries in the Union, we have N equations with (N   1) un-
knowns. In equilibrium
l˜1 + l˜2 + ... + l˜i + ... + ˜lN = 0 (A.2)
Substituting from (A.13),
21
2i
q1i(1+ l Ii + l˜i) 1  l I1+
22
2i
q2i(1+ l Ii + l˜i) 1  l I2+...+ l˜i +...+
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qNi(1+ l Ii + l˜i) 1  l IN = 0
(A.3)
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Rearranging the above equation we get
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Thus, net migration into country i from other members of the Union is given by
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The structural form of total employment in country i is
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Using the above expression for total employment, we can get the structural
form for wages, rental rate and profits as
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A.2 Derivation of optimal immigration quota and to-
tal employment for country i : Stage 1
The government maximizes its welfare function to obtain the optimal immigration
quota from the rest of the world. The government welfare is given by
GW (l Ii ) = s((l
I
i ) + r (l
I
i )Ki) + w(l
I
i )(1 + l˜i) + (w(l
I
i )  )l Ii (A.11)
Substituting the structural form of the wage, rental rate, profits and total labor
employment,
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Maximizing the above welfare function with respect to lIi to obtain optimal im-
migration quota for country i from the rest of the world.The first order condition
is
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Rearranging the above equation, we get the government’s optimal immigration
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quota for a given stock of capital
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Using the optimal immigration quota we can get total employment for country
i as
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The immigration quota of country i from ROW is lower as the number of coun-
tries in the Union N increases, for given immigration quotas of the other coun-
tries in the Union. The quota lˆIi is directly proportional to the proportion of en-
trepreneurs in the economy
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A.3 Floor with Symmetric countries : detailed cal-
culations
The immigration quota of country 1 when there are N =  countries in the Union
is given by
lˆ I1 =
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With the entry of the ( + 1)th country, and the immigration quota being fixed
at the afore mentioned level, we can evaluate total employment in country 1.
1 + lˆI1 + l˜1

+1
=

(s + 1)
4
2
41K
4
1
P
i=1
2i K
2
i
  (   1) 
X
i=2
lIi +
21K
2
1
+1P
i=2
(1 + lIi)
2i K
2
i
=

(s + 1)
4
2
41K
4
1
P
i=1
2i K
2
i
 
X
i=2
(1 + lIi) +
21K
2
1
+1P
i=2
(1 + lIi)
+1P
i=1
2i K
2
i
 
+1P
i=2
2i K
2
i
+1P
i=1
2i K
2
i
 
1 +

(s + 1)
4
2
41K
4
1
P
i=1
2i K
2
i
  n1  
X
i=2
(1 + lIi)
!
=

(s + 1)
4
2
41K
4
1
P
i=1
2i K
2
i
"
1 

(s + 1)
4
2
41K
4
1
P
i=1
2i K
2
i
#
 
X
i=2
(1 + lIi)
+
21K
2
1
+1P
i=2
(1 + lIi)
+1P
i=1
2i K
2
i
+
+1P
i=2
2i K
2
i
+1P
i=1
2i K
2
i
 X
i=2
(1 + lIi)

(A.17)
101
Thus,
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Country 1’s total employment when there are N =  countries in the Union is
given by
1 + lˆ I1 + l˜i
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If countries are symmetric in all respects such that 1 = 2 = ... = +1 and
K1 = K2 = ... = K+1, (A.19) and (A.18) can be expressed as respectively
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If the difference between (A.21) and (A.20) is positive, it implies that employ-
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ment is higher in the N = ( + 1) case,

s + 1
4
2 1
( + 1)
  1
2

2K2 +
1
 + 1
(1 + lI+1) > 0
1
 + 1
(1 + lI+1) >
1
2( + 1)

s + 1
4
2
2K2
1 + lI+1 >

s + 1
4
2
2K2
2
1 + lI+1 >
1

 X
i=1
(lIi + 1)

(A.22)
Since countries are all symmetric, lˆI1 = l
I
2 = ... = l
I
+1, both sides of the above
equation is similar. Thus, we can conclude that total employment and hence ,
wages stay at the same level as achieved under the N =  country case.
A.4 Profits
The net profit function of the entrepreneurs is given by
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I
1) + r (lˆ
I
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Substituting the structural form of the wage, rental rate, profits and total labor
employment, we get the net profit function as
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A.5 Asymmetric countries : Mathematical Proof
1. When there are N =  countries in the Union, net profits of the entrepreneurs
are given by
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The net profits of the entrepreneurs, when there are N =  + 1 countries in
the Union, and if country 1 cannot lower its immigration quota below what it
was at the N =  country level, is
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2. Comparing the government welfare when there are N =  countries in the
Union and when there are N =  + 1 countries but immigration quota is fixed
at the N =  country level. When there are N =    1 and N countries in the
Union, government welfare of country 1 can be expressed as respectively
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Now we analyse what happens to government welfare when the number of
countries in the Union increases from (N =    1) to N = , we can see that
the first order conditions for the government’s welfare maximization for the
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two cases are respectively
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Since the RHS of (A.30) is same as the RHS of (A.31), it must be the case
that X1 = X2. Thus we can rewrite (A.28) and (A.29) as respectively
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Since X1 = X2 =  and immigration quota is lower when there are  coun-
tries than when there are (  1) countries, if the government welfare has to
be greater when there are  countries than when there are  1 countries in
the Union, (A.33) should be larger than (A.32). For notational simplicity we
assume that the immigration quota of country i when there are  countries
in the Union as ˆlIi
0
. Thus, for a given stock of capital


2 + 2( ˆl I1
0   ˆl I1) + ... + 2(l I 1
0   l I 1) + 2l I
0
+ lˆ I1   ˆl I1
0
> 0 (A.34)
106
Since  > 0, it implies
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For given immigration quota of the other countries, this above condition can
be written as
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Using the expressions for the optimal immigration quota for country i when
there are N =  and N =  + 1 countries in the Union, the condition can be
further simplified to
1 + l I
0
>

s + 1
4
2
41K
4
1
 1P
j=1
2j K
2
j

2K
2
N
P
j=1
2j K
2
j

(A.37)
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
If country 2 and country 3 had the same technology (2 = 3) then country 1
would be indifferent between inviting either country to join the Union. However,
if 3 = 0 while 2 > 0, this would imply that output in country 3 will be zero for
any amount of factor inputs. Consequently, if country 1 wanted to invite country
3 to join the Union, all the labor from country 3 would want to move to country
1. Consequently, wage equalization in the Union would lead to wages being bid
down to approximately 0.1 For the current proof, without loss of generality we
1This is because for a Cobb-Douglas production function, as labor employment tends to infinity,
the wage asymptotically tends to 0.
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assume the wage in the rest of the world w = 0. This would again mean that
immigration quota in country 1 would be 0 since quota rent would be equal to 0.
As a singleton, while maximizing welfare, government of country 1 always has
the option of bidding down the wage to 0 by increasing their immigration quota.
Since quota rent is (wi   )  lI1, once the wage is close to 0, the quota rent will
also be close to 0. However, as a singleton country, we have already shown (sec-
tion 1.3.2) that the government of country 1 maximizes welfare with a quota that
does not take wages down to zero. This implies that bidding wages down to zero,
cannot give the government the optimal level of welfare. The above argument
implies that government welfare of country 1 (when 3 = 0) is achievable when it
is a singleton also. However, as a singleton country, the government of country
1 always chooses an immigration quota that does not bid down wages to zero to
maximize welfare. Thus, by revealed preference we find that government welfare
when country 1 is a singleton country is always greater than or equal to govern-
ment welfare when country 1 invites country 3 to join the Union when country 3
has 3 = 0.
We also know that government welfare for country 1 is higher when there is
more than one country in the Union (with positive TFP parameters) than when it
is a singleton country (Section 1.4.2). This implies government welfare of country
1 (when there are countries 1 and 2 in the Union) is greater than government
welfare of country 1 ( when Union is formed by countries 1 and 3 with 3=0).
Therefore, since country 1’s payoff from inducting country 3 is monotonically in-
creasing in 3, there must exist a value of 3 say ¯3 < 2 such that for all 3 in
(0, ¯3], government welfare is higher when countries 1 and 2 are in the Union
than when country 1 invites country 3 to join the Union before country 2. This
argument, delineated for a 3 country case, would also hold more generally.
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Appendix B
Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of the optimal contribution schedule
The government and the lobby share the surplus according to their bargaining
powers-
B =

SWD(lI) SWPE(lPEI )  ac(lPEI )lPEI )


(lPEI ) + r(l
PE
I )K  K  c(lPEI )lPEI   (lDI )  r(lDI )K + K
1  (B.1)
This yields
c(lPEI )l
PE
I =
(1  )(SWD(lDI )  SW PE (lPEI ))
a
+ 
 
(laI ) + r (l
a
I )K   (lDI )  r (lDI )K
!
(B.2)
To derive the optimal contribution schedule, we will analyse each component sep-
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arately,
SWD(lDI ) = s

(lDI ) + r(l
D
I )K  K

+ w(lDI ) + (w(l
D
I )  w   )lDI
= s

(
1
2
  )K
q
1 + lDI + K
 1
q
1 + lDI K

+
1
2
Kq
1 + lDI
+
 
1
2
Kq
1 + lDI
  w   
!
lDI   sK
=
 
s + 1
2
!
K
q
1 + lDI   (w + )lDI   sK
(B.3)
Similarly,
SW PE (lPEI ) =
 
s + 1
2
!
K 
q
1 + lPEI   (w + )lPEI (B.4)
Combining equation B.3 and B.4,
SWD(lDI )  SW PE (lPEI ) =
 
k + 1
2
!
K 
"q
1 + lDI  
q
1 + lPEI
#
  (w + )

lDI   lPEI

(B.5)
Considering the second term of B.1,
 
(lPEI ) + r (l
PE
I )K   (lDI )  r (lDI )K
!
=
1
2
K 
"q
1 + lPEI  
q
1 + lDI
#
(B.6)
Substituting B.5 and B.6 into the contribution schedule expressed in ,
c(lPEI )l
PE
I =
1  
a
"s + 1
2

K
hq
1 + lDI  
q
1 + lPEI
i
  (w + )

lDI   lPEI
#
+

2
K
"q
1 + lPEI  
q
1 + lDI
# (B.7)
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Thus, the contribution schedule simplifies to
c(lPEI )l
PE
I = K

hq
1 + lDI  
q
1 + lPEI
i"1  
a
1 + s
2

  
2
#
 
1  
a

(w + )(lDI   lPEI )
(B.8)
From the derivation of optimal immigration when a = 0 and a > 0, we have already
obtained the values for lDI and l
PE
I .
K 
hq
1 + lDI  
q
1 + lPEI
i
= K 
"1 + s
4
 K 
w + 

  K

4(w + )
(1+s(1+a))
#
(B.9)
Consequently, the first term of the B.8 becomes
K
hq
1 + lDI  
q
1 + lPEI
i"1  
a
1 + s
2

  
2
#
=
K2
4(w + )
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(1 + s)  (1 + s(1 + a))
i"1  
a
1 + s
2

  
2
#
=   sK
2
8(w + )
h
1 + s(1  )  (1 + a)
i
(B.10)
Similarly, plugging in the values of lDI and l
PE
I into the second term of B.8 yields,
1  
a

(w + )

lDI   lPEI

=
1  
a
 K2
16(w + )2
h
(1 + s)2   [1 + s(1 + a)]2
i
=  K
2(1  )
16(w + )
[2s + 2s2 + as2]
(B.11)
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Plugging in B.9 and B.10 into B.8 and simplifying,
c(lPEI )l
PE
I =  s
K2
8(w + )
h
1 + s(1  )  (1 + a)
i
+
K2(1  )
16(w + )
h
2s + 2s2 + as2
i
=
K2
16(w + )
h
2sa + as2   as2
i
=
sK2
16(w + )
h
2a + as(1  )
i
(B.12)
The above equation is the optimal contribution schedule that the lobby is willing
to provide the government to persuade the government to increase its quota of
immigration.
B.2 Derivation of optimal investment by entrepreneurs
in first stage
The net income of the entrepreneurs under political equilibrium is given by
(lPEI ) = (l
PE
I ) + r (l
PE
I )K   c(lPEI )lPEI   K (B.13)
Substituting the values for immigration and contributions from equations 2.15 and
2.18,
(lPEI ) =
1
2
K 2
4(w + )
[1 + s(1 + a)]  sK
2
16(w + )
h
2a + as(1  )
i
  K (B.14)
The first order condition from maximization is
@(lPEI )
@K
= 0 =>
K 1 2
8(w + )
h
2 + 2s(1 + a)  2sa   as2(1  )
i
= 1 (B.15)
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Thus, optimal capital investment is
K PE =
"

8(w + )
h
2(1 + s(1 + a))  s[2a + as(1  )]
i# 11 2
(B.16)
B.3 Dependence of government’s utility on its bar-
gaining power and capital intensity
For given stock of capital and immigration level, the Government’s welfare under
pure democracy is given by
GWD =
"
(1 + s)
4(w + )
# 2
1 2 1
(w + )
 
1 + s
4
!2
+ w +  (B.17)
Similarly, the government’s welfare function under political equilibrium is
GW PE =
"

8(w + )
h
2(1+s(1+a)) s(2a+as(1 )
i# 21 2" (1 + s)2 + a2s(2  s)
16(w + )
#
(B.18)
When  = 0
GWPE =
"

8(w + )
[2(1 + s(1 + a))  as2]
# 2
1 2 (1 + s)2
16(w + )
+ w + 
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)
+
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)
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(B.19)
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Similarly, when  = 1,
GWPE =
"

8(w + )
[2(1 + s(1 + a))  2as]
# 2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To enable us to understand the changes in government welfare under political
equilibrium due to changes in ,
@GWPE
@
=
2
1  2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"
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)
h
2(1 + s(1 + a))  s(2a + as(1  )
i# 2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(2as  as2)(
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1  2
h
(1 + s)2 + a2s(2  s)
i
+ a
h
2(1 + s(1 + a))  s(2a + as(1  ))
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(B.21)
Since 2as as2 = as(2 s) > 0, to show that government utility under political
equilibrium decreases with its bargaining power, we need to show that the term
within the curly brackets changes negatively with changes in . This, will yield us
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a certain level of capital intensity which will guarantee that within that particular
range, government’s utility is negatively related to its bargaining power. Let the
term within fg in equation B.21 be denoted by M and it can be written then written
as
M =
1
1  2
(
 2
h
(1+s)2+a2s(2 s)
i
+a(1 2)
h
2(1+s(1+a)) s(2a+ak (1 ))
i)
< 0
(B.22)
Solving the above equation leads to
 >
2a(1 + s) + 2a2s(1  )  a2s2(1  )
2
h
(1 + s)2 + 2a(1 + s) + a2s(2  s)
i (B.23)
Thus whenever capital is of more importance in the production process, given by
the range 2a(1+s)+2a
2s(1 ) a2s2(1 )
2
h
(1+s)2+2a(1+s)+a2s(2 s)
i <  < 12 , the government’s utility under political
equilibrium is a decreasing function of its bargaining power.
B.4 Derivation of political equilibrium under insti-
tutions and its relation with government’s bar-
gaining power : Proof of Proposition 5
We will compare between GWPE and NGW to understand the government’s
choice of  at every level of its bargaining power. We will first show that at  = 0,
NGW < GWPE. At  = 0,
GW PE = f 
8(w + )
[2(1 + s(1 + a))  as2]g 21 2 (1 + s)
2
16(w + )
+ (w + )
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and
GWPEi = f 
4(w + )
[(1 + s(1 + a))  P
a
]g 21 2
1
16(w + )
[2(k + 1)(1 + s(1 + a))  (1 + s(1 + a))2 + 2P] + (w + )
(B.24)
where
P = P(,) = [(1+s) (1+s(1+a))]f1+s (1+s+a)g (1  
2
)[2(1+s)2 (1+s(1+a))2]
At  = 1 and  = 0,
dP
d
= 0) d(GW
PEi )
d
= 0
) d(NGW
PEi )
d
=
d
d
[GW PE
0   2Q] =  2Q < 0
Thus as  increases , the government’s net welfare from moving to an institution
decreases. The government will not want to then choose a  which is higher than
its minimum value and hence optimal  = 1 and hence, the threat point is the
same as in pure democracy. Now at  = 1,
NGW  = max
=1
NGW PEi = GW PEi=1  Q
Also, at  = 0,  = 1, GWPEi = GWPE. Hence, at  = 0, NGW = GWPE   Q as
Q > 0. This implies that NGW < GWPE when  = 0. Now we will show that at
 = 1, NGW > GWPE. At  = 1,
GW PE = f 
4(w + )
[(1 + s(1 + a))  as]g 2(1 2 [ (1 + s)
2 + a2s(2  s)
16(w + )
] + (w + )
and
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GW PEi = f(1 + s)
4(w + )
g 21 2 1
16(w + )
[2(s+1)(1+s(1+a)) (1+s(1+a))2 2[(1+s) (1+s(1+a))]]
+(w + )
where
P = a[(1 + s)  (1 + s(1 + a))]
At  = 1 and  = 1, If  is high enough (which is the case we have considered)
then
dGW PEi
d
> 0
This implies that if production function is relatively capital intensive, as  in-
creases, the government’s net welfare from moving to an institution increases.
Hence, government will want to choose a  (say, ) which is greater than its
minimum value of 1.
Again it can be shown that at  = 1,  = 1
GW PE = GW PEi
Therefore, for  =  when  > 1,
GW PEi > GW PE
NGW  = max
=
NGW PEi = GW PEi=   2Q
If Q is less than a certain threshold (that is the cost of tying hands is not too high)
then at  = 1,
NGW  > GW PE
Earlier we have shown that for  = 0, GEI < GWPE. Since both GWI and GWPE
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are continuous function of , we can apply the Intermediate value theorem and
say that there exists a ¯ < 1 such that for  > ¯ we have GWI > GWPE. Thus
government with high bargaining power will tie its hands and for low , GWI <
GWPE.
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Appendix C
Chapter 3
C.1 Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants
with Children
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 11,005.600*** 9,703.907*** 14,752.456***
(3,006.260) (2,770.921) (2,573.225)
Avg House prices 0.144 -0.177
(0.125) (0.358)
Unemployment rate -304.570 1,780.215
(565.287) (2,902.265)
Eco activity rate -1,866.503 3,398.949
(2,281.922) (2,469.253)
Prop. of Muslims -195,436.630 -297,745.132
(316,454.369) (464,796.378)
Prop. of Hindus -2,950,754.012** -3,644,297.208*
(1,120,954.756) (1,361,845.216)
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.959 0.959 0.987
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.2 Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants
with children, by occupation groups
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 1,132.549*** 980.242*** 1,354.149***
(320.870) (354.727) (480.608)
Avg House prices 0.018 -0.007
(0.017) (0.068)
Unemployment rate -13.725 85.170
(73.214) (541.142)
Mean net pay 0.046 -0.102
(0.094) (0.160)
Eco activity rate -158.714 92.502
(305.848) (458.261)
Prop. of Muslims -18,303.133 -30,649.156
(41,624.095) (86,203.955)
Prop. of Hindu -297,422.198** -363,534.573
(146,873.666) (250,415.595)
Observations 195 195 195
R-squared 0.751 0.763 0.770
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.3 Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants
without Children
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 6,914.033 7,189.675 7,799.312
(4,437.606) (4,668.104) (7,439.728)
Avg house price 0.175 0.440
(0.211) (1.035)
Unemployment rate -818.411 3,783.665
(952.325) (8,391.051)
Eco activity rate -3,301.315 -876.571
(3,844.300) (7,139.123)
Prop of Muslims -705,443.875 -800,349.384
(533,123.065) (1343822.714)
Prop of Hindu -2,799,714.883 -2,963,438.428
(1,888,445.521) (3,937,376.925)
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.967 0.979 0.991
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.4 Effect of Academies Act on Male Immigrants
without children, by Occupation groups
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 568.948 591.592 929.751
(376.751) (422.855) (574.063)
Avg house price 0.006 -0.053
(0.020) (0.081)
Unemployment rate -117.503 -38.007
(87.155) (639.401)
Mean net pay -0.015 -0.166
(0.112) (0.191)
Eco activity rate -102.193 232.234
(362.671) (543.828)
Prop of Muslims -27,180.658 12,836.254
(49,431.555) (103,256.405)
Prop of Hindu -170,033.901 -179,415.380
(173,418.179) (299,941.061)
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.727 0.735 0.740
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.5 Specification with dependent variable as share
of male immigrants with/without children to to-
tal population in a region
C.5.1 Effect of Academies Act on share of male immigrants
with children to total population, without occupation cat-
egories
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 0.002* 0.001 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008)
Avg house price 6.33e-08 -2.99e-08
(4.58e-08) (9.99e-08)
Unemployment rate -1.74e-05 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.001)
Eco activity rate -0.002* -8.05e-05
(0.001) (0.001)
Prop of Muslims -0.097 -0.089
(0.116) (0.130)
Prop of Hindus -0.870* -0.796
(0.410) (0.380)
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.861 0.930 0.994
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.5.2 Effect of Academies Act on share of male immigrants
with children to total population, with occupation cate-
gories
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 0.005** 0.003 0.006*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg house price 1.69e-07 -1.67e-07
(1.17e-07) (4.63e-07)
Unemployment rate 0.0002 -0.0012
(0.0005) (0.0037)
Mean net pay 3.76e-08 -2.42e-06**
(6.56e-07) (1.09e-06)
Eco activity rate -0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Prop of Muslims -0.154 -0.0401
(0.290) (0.586)
Prop of Hindu -1.608 -1.634
(1.023) (1.702)
Observations 195 195 195
R-squared 0.727 0.744 0.763
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.5.3 Effect of Academies Act on share of male immigrants
without children to total population, without occupation
categories
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 0.001 5.95e-05 -0.0001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg house price 4.51e-08 3.90e-07
(1.11e-07) (4.30e-07)
Unemployment rate -0.0003 -0.0016
(0.0005) (0.0035)
Eco activity rate -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Prop of Muslims -0.171 -0.441
(0.280) (0.558)
Prop of Hindu -0.315 -0.776
(0.991) (1.634)
Observations 22 22 22
R-squared 0.661 0.738 0.926
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.5.4 Effect of Academies Act on share of male immigrants
without children to total population, with occupation cat-
egories
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Avg house price -2.36e-08 -7.98e-07
(1.41e-07) (5.45e-07)
Unemployment rate -0.001 -0.0041
(0.001) (0.004)
Mean Net Pay -3.16e-07 -2.91e-06**
(7.88e-07) (1.29e-06)
Eco activity rate -0.002 0.0004
(0.003) (0.0046)
Prop of Muslims -0.008 0.659
(0.349) (0.694)
Prop of Hindu -0.366 -0.259
(1.223) (2.017)
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.637 0.645 0.683
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.6 Parallel Trends
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
Aftert  Treats 1,483.038*** 1,188.398*** 1,353.118*
(379.203) (439.802) (778.480)
Avg house price 0.013 0.009
(0.021) (0.082)
Unemployment rate -30.239 -29.856
(87.434) (810.453)
Mean Net Pay 0.059 -0.107
(0.096) (0.162)
Eco activity rate -69.742 206.891
(360.799) (483.538)
Prop of Muslims -9,054.229 -46,732.082
(63,101.733) (101,828.631)
Prop of Hindu -268,273.700 -535,855.152
(210,192.737) (339,166.236)
2007 Treats 359.556 138.269 206.730
(454.439) (704.316) (1,000.238)
2008 Treats 551.111 507.323 295.538
(454.439) (494.646) (1,107.220)
2009 Treats 841.778* 258.935 -678.484
(454.439) (651.993) (1,188.926)
Observations 195 195 195
R-squared 0.756 0.765 0.771
Major occ group FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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